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This thesis studies determinants of income inequality using data from The World Top 
Incomes Database. The focus is on top tax rates, unions and trade openness. There is found 
that the erosion of unions and top tax rates are associated with the rise in top income shares 
in the sample of OECD countries. In addition, there is found that increase of trade openness is 
associated with the increase in top income shares.  
There is support for a lag structure of tax changes, and a positive cross-level interaction 
between the level of taxation in the period and the effect of tax changes. In addition, there is 
support for a significant positive interaction between the level of trade openness and the 
effect of union density changes. 
These associations are found utilizing a random-effects multilevel model, separating 
between and within effects, applied to annual longitudinal data covering the period 1981-
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The distribution of resources have long been recognized as an important element of 
organization and functioning of states. Indeed, Plato discussed how the distribution and 
hunger for gold could bring about an oligarchy where wealth is concentrated on ever fewer 
hands, and laws are twisted so that the wealthy does not have to oblige them (Plato, 2001, 
pp. 908-311)1.  
Distribution of resources have also been associated with a stable democracy:  “Increased 
wealth is not only related causally to the development of democracy by changing the social 
conditions of the workers, but it also affects the political role of the middle class through the 
shape of the stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large 
lower-class base, to a diamond with a growing middle class.” (Lipset, 1959, p. 83) 
As the title of this thesis suggest, it is not the distribution of wealth that is of concern 
here, but the distribution of income. The concepts are closely related, however, there is a 
difference. Wealth (accumulated resources at a given time), is the sum of income spent (the 
flow of resources in a given period) and previous wealth. A highly skewed distribution of 
income can thus be a first step toward a highly skewed distribution of wealth2. 
In the years after World War 2, and to the late 1970s, Lipset (1959)’s implicit assumption 
of economic development increasing the middle class seemed to hold in the United States. 
The economy grew steadily, as did wages of the average worker, and economic gains became 
more equally distributed. This changed somewhere in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Suddenly 
wages began a long downward trend, and even though more family members than ever 
before were working, median family income stopped growing. At the same time, the amount 
of people earning high incomes rose as well, leaving a declining proportion of employees 
receiving mid-level incomes (Harrison & Bluestone, 1990, pp. 4-5). 
 
                                                     
1 The Republic, book 8, lines 550-552. 
2 Conditioned on consumption patterns, income mobility and demographics. 
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The status in 2013 was that ten percent of 
Americans claimed almost half (47%) of all gross 
income in the United States, the largest income 
share concentrated in this group since the 1930s3. 
Clearly, not all segments of the society have 
benefitted equally from economic development. The 
pyramid might have become more like a diamond for 
a while, but that is a trend long gone.  
The increasing income inequality is not unique 
to the US by any means. Top incomes have increased enormously in the US and other English-
speaking countries over the past three decades (Piketty & Saez, 2006, p. 204). Meanwhile, 
European countries and Japan have had relatively stable top income shares, although there 
are increasing trends in most of these countries as well. The US inequality might, however, be 
the most pronounced, and have been the focus of the lion’s share of research concerning 
inequality in developed countries (Mahler, Jesuit, & Roscoe, 1999, p. 368).  
To make a comparison of differences concerning the income shares between countries, 
the highest-earning ten percent of Swedes claimed 28% of total gross income in 2013, and 
23% in 1980. The rather large differences between Sweden and the US, both in level and 
growth of inequality, indicates that large inequalities are not inevitable. Markets may have 
created these inequalities, but laws, regulations and institutions shape the markets (Stiglitz, 
2012, p. 66). 
Understanding causes behind the rise in income inequality should be of concern for 
political scientists and policy makers. Inequality might not pose a direct threat to the stability 
of democratic institutions in the near future. However, high levels of economic inequality 
leads to political inequality (Stiglitz, 2015, p. 125). Moreover, inequality have major impacts 
on living conditions of substantial proportions of the population in both the long and the short 
                                                     
3 Data from The World Top Incomes Database (October 31., 2015) 




term. Income (and wealth) affects, for example, decisions and opportunities to get education, 
sufficient healthcare, and the ability to use the legal system (Stiglitz, 2012). 
1.1 Brief overview of the research field 
Explanations for the rise in inequality in the developed world focus either on market-
driven forces or on institutional changes. According the market forces hypothesis, the rise in 
inequality reflects skill-biased technical change and globalization (Jaumotte & Buitron, 2015, 
p. 7). In this framework, wages are determined by supply and demand (the market) for labor. 
Technological change have increased demand for higher skilled workers, and decreased 
demand for low-skilled workers. Thus, market changes have increased the skill (educational) 
premium and increased inequality (consult Goldin and Katz (2007) for a study of the United 
States, see Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) for interesting ideas about potential future 
implications, also consult also Card and DiNardo (2002) for problems related to the skill-biased 
technological change hypothesis). In a similar fashion, globalization, working through 
increased global competition, have increased demand for capital, and decreased demand for 
labor (in developed countries) (consult Stolper and Samuelson (1941) for theoretical 
arguments). 
Institutional features cited as determinants of income inequality includes top personal 
income tax rates (consult Atkinson (2004) for a long run descriptive study of taxes and top 
incomes, and consult Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2011) for models on tax changes and 
responses), and financial deregulation (consult Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2013) for arguments 
how high skilled-labor can benefit relatively more than low-skilled labor).  
Features related to the labor market, such as union density rates (consult Card (2001) 
for a study of unions and wage inequality in the US, consult Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004) 
for a study of the US, the UK and Canada) and minimum wage (consult Lee (1999) for a study 
of minimum wages and wage inequality in the US) are linked to inequality of incomes. 
1.1.1 Research gap 
The erosion of labor market institutions have been relatively little investigated in the 
context of income inequality (Jaumotte & Buitron, 2015, p. 5). This is especially true for cross-
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country analyses. Consequently, there have been little effort to investigate any potential 
interactions between market-driven forces and labor market institutions.  
This thesis utilizes longitudinal analysis, which is seen as the natural next step in 
investigation of income inequality (Piketty, 2005, pp. 387-388). Previous databases have been 
haunted by various problems (Piketty, 2005, pp. 382-383) and opportunities to investigate the 
income distribution utilizing cross-country analysis in a rigorous way have therefore been 
limited. However, the possibility to use longitudinal analysis have increased by the publication 
of the World Top Incomes Database (WTID), motivated by dissatisfaction over existing 
databases. This database is fully homogenous across countries, annual and long-run (Piketty, 
2005, p. 383), making it suited for longitudinal analysis. 
This thesis investigates the proportion of the total income claimed by the top 10% (the 
top decile), and how institutional changes (represented with top tax rates and labor union 
density) and trade openness relates to it. In addition, this thesis investigates potential 
interactions between trade openness and labor unions. This is done by analyzing 19 OECD 
countries4 (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), which are considered 
relatively developed in the period. This will test the theoretical assumptions and expectations, 
largely investigated and developed in the context of the US, in a broader context.  
The use of top decile income shares and longitudinal models are not completely novel. 
Two studies investigating developed countries and top decile income share are Jaumotte and 
Buitron (2015) and Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009). 
 Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) investigates top decile income shares by labor market 
institutions (labor unions, extensions and minimum wages) and top tax rates, while controlling 
for market-driven forces. They use both event analysis and longitudinal analysis (three-stage 
least squares). 
 Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) investigates the bottom nine deciles (the 
inverse of the top decile) by economic development, financial development, trade openness, 
                                                     
4 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. 
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government expenditure and taxation. They use 5-year averages and a first-difference model 
including a lagged dependent variable. 
The main novelty of this thesis lies in the statistical method used. A random-effects 
multilevel model which separates the between and within effects is utilized. This approach 
achieve the unbiasedness of the fixed-effects approach, but at the same time, it 
accommodates information about potential level effects of the explanatory variables. This 
approach allows for more exploration of the data, and especially between the level and 
changes of variables. As a result, this thesis goes somewhat longer in exploring potential 
interactions between labor market institutions and market-forces than earlier comparable 
studies. 
1.2 Research question  
The research question this thesis seek to answer is: 
“Can collective bargaining, tax policy and trade openness explain the increase in the 
top deciles' gross income share in OECD countries in the period 1981-2011?” 
These relationships are of interest because they are largely results of policy, and if they 
indeed affect the income distribution, then policy can be used actively to manage the 
distribution of income. As mentioned already, there are several reasons for why the income 
distribution should be of interest. If the inequality can be managed, there is surely of interest 
to know how this can be achieved.  
1.3 Findings 
The main findings can be summarized as follows: there is found support for the 
hypothesis that changes in trade openness affects the top decile income share. This 
relationship is positive, indicating that increasing trade openness could have increased the top 
decile income share. There is also support for the hypothesis that changes in top tax rates 
affects the top decile income share. This relationship is rather complex, with a negative lag 
structure of two years, in addition to country mean top tax rates acting as moderators of the 
country specific effects. Taken together, the relationship is negative, indicating that reduction 
of top tax rates could have increased the top decile income share. Lastly, it is found support 
for the hypothesis that changes in labor union density rates affects the top decile income 
6 
 
share. This relationship is primarily negative, indicating that the decrease in labor union 
density could have increased the top decile income share. However, the effect is found to be 
moderated by the level of import/trade penetration of countries, with higher average 
import/trade penetration in the period indicating less (negative) effect of unions. 
1.4 Structure 
The next chapter outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework used in this thesis. 
Concepts of inequality, income distribution and income sources are introduced. Theoretical 
expectations about the association between the income distribution, trade openness, top tax 
rates and collective bargaining are outlined. The chapter ends with introducing a set of general 
hypotheses. In “Research design” arguments for utilizing the multilevel longitudinal analysis 
technique are presented, and concerns related to the choice of method are discussed. The 
chapter ends with presenting the modeling process. “Data collection” describes the data 
collection process. It provides reasoning behind the choice of indicators, and ends with a 
discussion of the case selection, statistical significance testing and generalization. “Descriptive 
statistics” presents numeric and graphical description of the variables. “Results” introduces 
empirical hypotheses, presents the result of a regression model utilizing all observations, and 
discuss the hypotheses in light of the model. In “Diagnostics and model specification” 
diagnostics of the model presented in Results are presented. In addition, alternative models 
and model specifications are presented to test the robustness of the model. Specific reasons 
for including the alternative models are also given. In “Discussion” the findings are reviewed 
and placed in the context of earlier research. The chapter also presents a final assessment of 
each component of the research question. In Concluding remarks the results are summarized 





2 Theoretical and conceptual framework 
This chapter starts with laying out the conceptual framework used in this thesis. The 
concept of income distribution and inequality, income sources and types of income is 
introduced. Following is the theoretical framework, which the thesis is built upon. After going 
through the theoretical assumptions, the chapter ends with the introduction of a set of 
hypotheses. 
2.1 Income distribution – what is it? 
In a general term, “distribution” refers to how values on a certain variable are spread 
across a defined population. Two extreme distributions are: 1) everyone in the population has 
exactly the same value on the variable, and 2) it is only one individual in the population having 
(a value on) the variable.  
 
 
Figure 2 Two extreme distributions 
When talking about inequality we also talk about the distribution of some variable. We 
state that the distribution is not equal – not everyone has the same value. Income inequality 
is thus a way to refer to how the income is distributed in the population. The degree of 
inequality lies somewhere between the two extremes, and the term “inequality” in itself does 
not indicate this degree.  
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2.1.1 Total, capital and labor income 
By definition, the total income distribution is the result of adding up two components: 
inequality from income of labor and inequality of income from capital. It follows that the more 
unequally distributed each of these two components are, the greater the total inequality will 
be (Piketty, 2014, p. 242). 
Even though it is true that the inequalities with respect to labor have always been much 
smaller than inequalities from capital, income from labor generally 
accounts for two-thirds to three-quarters of national income. There 
are also substantial differences between countries in the distribution 
of income from labor, which suggest that public policies and national 
differences can have major consequences for the labor income 
distribution. This in turn has a great impact on the living condition of 
large numbers of people (Piketty, 2014, p. 255). There is also the issue 
that capital accumulation by the “working rich” could lead 
up to the revival of top capital incomes in the following generation (Piketty, 2005, p. 387).  
Depending on the savings rate, the present income will affect the distribution of wealth 
in the future. This was recognized by Kuznets (1955), and it is one of the divergent forces he 
discusses. “According to all recent studies of the apportionment of income between 
consumption, only the upper-income groups save; the total savings of groups below the top 
decile are fairly close to zero. (…) Other conditions being equal, the cumulative effect of such 
inequality in savings would be the concentration of an increasing proportion of income-
yielding assets in the hands of the upper groups – a basis for larger income shares of these 
groups and their descendants.” (Kuznets, 1955, p. 7) 
 Newer studies support the relationship between savings and income (see for example 
Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004)). The distribution of total income can thus have quite 
substancial impact on the society, both in the short term (current income) and in the long 
term (capital accumulation). Since capital itself is a source of income, the inequality in capital 
and wealth will also induce larger income inequality in the future. 
 
Figure 3 Income sources 
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2.1.2 Gross and net income 
The type of income that will be investigated in this thesis is the gross income, that is: 
income gained before taxes and transfers. The net or “disposable” income is the gross income 
after taxes and redistribution. The net income is the income we are free to spend as we 
choose, and ultimately what affects society.  
 
Figure 4 From gross to net income 
There are two ways to alter the net income distribution: we could alter the gross income 
distribution, and we could alter the tax and redistribution policies.  
When we are looking at the net income distribution, we are really looking at the sum of 
two phenomena interacting: the gross income distribution and the tax and redistribution 
policies. It therefore makes sense to investigate policy impact on the gross income 
distribution, as it indicates how policy can alter the market-driven income distribution without 
disturbances from the redistribution.  
2.2 What is behind the rise in inequality? 
The factors concerning inequality have roughly been divided into two categories: 
market-driven forces and institutional changes. The rise in observed income inequality have 
coincided with the “second globalization” wave, which has been under way since the 1970s, 
and the “conservative revolution” starting around 1980s, characterized by a shift from 
“planning” to “market”.  
It can be argued that the conservative revolution around the 1980s was a response to 
the increased global competition and relative stagnation of the domestic economic growth 
(Piketty, 2014, p. 98). Thatcher and Reagan, state leaders in the United Kingdom in 1979-1990 
and the United States in 1981-1989, relied on the doctrine of laissez-faire. Laissez-faire is the 
theory that commercial markets function best with minimal interfering from governments 
(Harrison & Bluestone, 1990, pp. 78-79). This period saw a reduction in taxation and a souring 
Gross income Taxation/redistribution Net income
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sentiment toward unions and collective bargaining, as both of were thought to distort markets 
and slow economic growth. 
Globalization, like the shift in government policy have been seen as drivers for increasing 
inequality. One aspect of globalization thought to affect the distribution of income, is the 
economic openness of a country. Regarding the institutional factors, decreasing tax rates and 
the decreasing role of unions and collective bargaining are interpreted as potential 
explanations for the increase in inequality. 
The factors under investigation here are largely related to the bargaining position of 
workers and the labor income distribution. The labor income accounts for around two-thirds 
of total income and is therefore of great importance in the total income distribution. 
2.2.1 Unions and collective bargaining coverage 
Collective bargaining is a process of decision-making between parties representing 
employer and employee interests. Creating institutions to improve the bargaining position of 
workers has historically been an important impetus to collective bargaining (Traxler, 1994, p. 
168). 
The industrial relations system, which constitute a “web of rules” relating the bargaining 
units, greatly affects the collective bargaining process – and results. Labor unions are 
organizations of workers whose primary objectives are to improve the wage and non-wage 
conditions of employment among their members, and union density  is one indicator of the 
character of a country’s industrial relations system (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012, p. 444; Traxler, 
1994, p. 167). 
Unions have different strategies and tools to improve the conditions of their members. 
One strategy is bargaining for contracts and agreements on behalf of their members. The idea 
is that the bargaining position is better for unions as a group than individual employees 
bargaining for their wages and conditions on an individual level with their employer. The 
unions might bargain directly for higher wages, but unions can also push for staffing 
requirements, which in turn increase the demand for workers (or at least hinder future job 
cuts). Unions can also bargain for contracts that prohibit subcontracting, hindering the 
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alternative of the employer to subcontract nonunionized and cheaper labor (lower wages 
and/or worse benefits). 
Unions can increase the cost of other close substitutes of workers. They can for example 
lobby for import quotas, thereby increasing the cost of imports. By making import more 
expensive, the production of similar goods within the country becomes relatively cheaper, 
making it more profitable to produce those goods domestically. Increasing, or maintaining, 
production within a country will protect the jobs associated with that production.  Unions 
could also bargain and lobby for minimum wages. Consequently, employing non-unionized 
workers is less attractive. However, bargaining for minimum wages also lift the least paid 
workers wages, compressing the income distribution. 
Unions could also affect the wage distribution through more informal channels. Unions 
can, for example, promote norms of equity, not just at the lower part of the distribution, but 
also protesting the pay of the upper management (Western & Rosenfeld, 2011, pp. 517-518).  
They have also driven public relations campaigns to increase demand for products produced 
by union members (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012, p. 462).  
Perhaps the most powerful feature of a union is the ability to execute strikes and work 
slowdowns. These measures can impose potentially high costs to the employer if they do not 
agree to the terms and conditions specified by the union in question. The cost could be higher 
than the cost of agreement, in turn making it less attractive to fight for better agreements for 
the employer. 
If unions increase the wages of their members, and the top earners are unaffected we 
should see a relative contraction of the income inequality. If the top wages are also 
constrained by social norms, the relative contraction will be even more pronounced. If, 
however, an increase in the wages of unionized workers is bought at the price of a higher 
unemployment rate, the contraction of the income distribution might be lower, or maybe 
even increase income inequality, depending on the relative effects of the unemployment rate 
and the wage effect. 
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2.2.2 Top tax rates 
A decrease in the top tax rate can change the bargaining power of executives. It is always 
difficult for an executive to convince other parties involved in the firm that a large increase in 
his or her wage is truly justified. When the top tax rate is very high a large fraction of a 
potential wage increase goes directly to the government, and the executive will have little 
reason to fight for that wage increase. At the same time, other parties will be less inclined to 
accept the increase. However, if the tax rate were lowered, the incentive for the executive to 
chase the wage increase intensifies. The executive would gain more from an increase, and the 
executive will do more to persuade other interested parties to grant the raise (Piketty, 2014, 
p. 510). 
Leaving out the bargaining aspect, there are generally two effects concerning taxation 
on wages. These are the substitution and income effect. The substitution effect is the 
tendency to substitute one good for another as the price of the first good increases. As the 
tax rate increases, the effect could be that the people affected will work less, as they are paid 
less and the “cost of leisure” decreases. If top earners work less their income decreases, and 
if the rest work just as much as previously this should compress the income inequality.  The 
other effect is the income effect. The income effect is what affects people to work more, in 
order to keep their net income from going down and wanting to keep their standard of living 
(Gayer & Rosen, 2010, pp. 416-417). If the top earners work more, their gross income increase, 
and if everyone else work just as much as before, the gross income distribution would widen. 
The effect of taxation on income inequality is thus dependent on which effect is the 
stronger. There is of course a practical limit to how many hours one can work any given day, 
and at some point, the substitution effect will appear. 
This gives the top tax rates at least three potential effects on the income distribution. 
First, it could lower the incentives for high-income individuals to bargain for higher wages. 
This should result in an unchanged gross income if their work hours are unchanged. Two, it 
could discourage high-income individuals from working as much as before, lowering total 
working hours, thereby reducing their gross income. If the wages and working hours for the 
rest are unchanged, the effect should be a contraction of the income distribution. Third, it 
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could encourage high-income individuals to increase working hours in order to keep their net 
income level, which should increase their gross income, ultimately widening the income 
distribution. 
2.2.3 Trade and economic openness 
The critics of globalization claims that the rapidly growing movement of goods, services, 
and capital throughout the world has forced workers into ruthless global competition, 
jeopardizing wages, benefits and job security previously extracted from employers during 
many decades (Mahler et al., 1999, p. 364).  
The effects of trade on the income distribution could be different for how the relative 
supply of capital and labor is in the country. International trade is expected to lower the wage 
of the scarce factor of production. In countries where capital is relatively abundant, as is 
assumed is the case for most of the countries in the analysis, the increased trade openness is 
thought to reduce the wages of lower skilled labor (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). 
However, “trade” is comprised of both import and export, which could have adverse 
effects on the income distribution, and greater international trade generally means that both 
the country’s imports and exports increase.  
The increase in exports should increase the demand for workers involved in the 
production of the goods exported. Not only will more people be employed and become wage 
earners, but also the bargaining position for workers and unions will increase as the relative 
supply of workers decreases. 
The increase in imports tends to directly, or indirectly, reduce the demand for some 
domestically produced goods. Some of the import is likely to substitute for goods that would 
have been produced domestically (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012, p. 568). This is likely to reduce 
the amount of wage earners and to weaken the bargaining position of workers and unions, 
which ultimately reduces the wages of low-skilled labor (Harrison & Bluestone, 1990, pp. 35-
36; Reuveny & Li, 2003, p. 579). 
Even if import has a negative impact on the wages of lower paid workers, the effects of 
trade in the longer run might be less negative. If trade makes the country as a whole better 
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off economically, then the domestic demand for goods and services should increase, assuming 
resources are spent, at least partially, on domestically produced goods and services. This in 
turn should increase the demand for workers producing these goods and services (Ehrenberg 
& Smith, 2012, p. 568).  
The expected effects of trade on the income distribution is unclear. Import could hurt 
low-skilled workers, by the import acting as substitutes for their work, leading to a worse 
bargaining position for the workers and unions, ultimately increasing the income inequality. 
Export, on the other hand, is likely to create jobs and thus contribute to a compression of the 
income distribution. The total impact on trade, then, is conditioned on which effect is the 
greatest. Even if trade in the short run is negative for the income distribution, the effect could 
be less negative in the long run if the increase in cost effectiveness for consumers and 
corporations is used on domestically produced goods and services, which would produce 
more jobs in the country. This is again conditioned on what sort of jobs are created. If the new 
jobs are low-income jobs, this potential positive effect could be rather small. 
2.2.4 Expectations 
As is apparent from the brief overview, there is no general theoretical consensus on how 
and in what degree any of the factors affects the income distribution. Using earlier research 
in combination with these theoretical expectations, the following general hypotheses are 
formulated: 
H1: Unions and collective bargaining reduces the income inequality 
H2: Higher tax rates reduces the income inequality 
H3: Trade and economic openness increases the inequality 




Figure 5 Theoretical model 
These factors are in various degrees shaped by policies, and can thereby be altered. 
Import can be regulated, for example, through import quotas. This might not be optimal, as 
import is generally seen as beneficial for the economy as a whole. There might be better to 
use some of the benefits of import to compensate the workers hit by the import through other 
channels such as subsidy or redistributive measures (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941, p. 73). The 
Reagan administration have been criticized for both implicit and explicit attacking unions, and 
even the very principle of unionization (Harrison & Bluestone, 1990, p. 78). If this reduced the 
sentiment and bargaining power of unions, then government should also be able to improve 
and the sentiment and facilitate for collective bargaining. Export can be encouraged through 
increased competitiveness. There are several ways to increase this, for example to improve 
the infrastructure and increase the skill-level of the labor force through the educational 
system. The tax rates, however, are directly affected by legislation. 
If these factors do affect the distribution of incomes, then knowledge about the relations 
and mechanisms can be used as a basis for policy. As noted in the introduction, the inequality 
of incomes bring about a host of negative consequences for a large proportion of the 
population. There is also reasons to believe that high inequality is bad for economic growth 
and economic stability (Stiglitz, 2012, pp. 106-115), which in turn have more negative 











3 Research design 
This chapter lays out the reasoning behind the choice of the longitudinal analysis. It 
continues with arguments for why a multilevel approach is appropriate for longitudinal 
research. Next follows a discussion about fixed and random effects estimators, which are two 
main estimators within the multilevel framework, and why an approach that separates 
between and within effects is chosen. The next section considers special concerns for 
longitudinal analysis, such as trends, stationarity, autocorrelation and cross-sectional 
correlation, and how these issues are tackled. The last section considers model specification 
and the building process. The issues of dynamics, estimation method, LR-tests and the choice 
of residual structure are considered.   
3.1 Goals and tools 
Collier, Brady, and Seawright (2004) suggests that the choice of tools is a pragmatic 
matter that should reflect the goals of the analysis. King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, pp. 4-6) 
argues that the differences between the quantitative and qualitative traditions are 
methodologically and substantively unimportant. According to King et al. (1994), all good 
research can be understood from the same underlying logic of inference. The rules of 
inference are relevant to all research where the goal is to learn facts about the real world.  
Within the positivist tradition the statistical method is highly regarded. The statistical 
method is not as well regarded as the experiment, which in this topic, as often is the social 
sciences, a practical impossibility. The perceived strength of statistics for positivists lies in its 
ability to compare and control. Through control and comparison, the scientist is able to 
identify, isolate and explore regularities in the world (Moses & Knutsen, 2012, p. 50). 
Even though statistics enjoy a highly regarded position within the positivist tradition, 
this is not the case within the constructivist tradition. The debate between the positivist and 
constructivist traditions can be boiled down to the ontological view. The worldview in turn 
affects what we can know about the world, and that in turn affects how we can obtain that 
knowledge. By using a statistical approach the assumption that it is possible to have some 
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knowledge about the external world is implicitly made (King et al., 1994, p. 6; Moses & 
Knutsen, 2012, p. 91).  
On a general ground, the positivist tradition is criticized for ignoring human agency, 
context, the connectedness of the world and meaning. The critique becomes clear just looking 
at the very process of quantification. The process involves that we interpret social 
phenomena, categorize and assign values in order to compare and analyze. This process 
necessitates losing the social context, and with it, a good portion of meaning. When we take 
social phenomena out of the context in order to compare the interpretation can become 
unclear, as it is unclear if we even compare the same phenomena. As Moses and Knutsen 
(2012, p. 260) writes: ”(…) the first casualties of quantification are interpretation and context.” 
Admittedly, the statistical method simplifies the world and makes unrealistic 
assumptions. The costs of the particular may be great, but as King et al. (1994, p. 43) writes: 
“Systematic simplification is a crucial step to useful knowledge.”. 
3.2 Longitudinal analysis 
The research question implies change over time in different units. Longitudinal data 
analysis seems to be a natural choice of statistical method. With longitudinal data, we can 
observe subjects over time, and we can observe many subjects. This allows us to study 
dynamics and cross-sectional aspects of a problem. As Frees (2004, p. 2)  writes: “Longitudinal 
data analysis represents a marriage of regression and time-series analysis”. 
In addition to allowing us to study both cross-country and time effects, the longitudinal 
approach have the advantage of increasing the number of observations in the analysis. This is 
a strength when it comes to falsifiability, enhancing explanatory leverage and addressing 
multicollinearity (Collier et al., 2004, p. 157). However, the increasing of observations come 
at a cost. 
 Collier et al. (2004) discusses four trade-offs related to increasing the number of 
observations. All of them can be traced back to the issues of context and interpretation. The 
first and most elementary is whether the observations have a relevance for the research 
question. As noted above, the time aspect is of relevance for the research question. The 
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second highlights that measurement validity is context specific. The third highlights that 
cultures and relevant aspects of history not only differ across states (which in itself is a 
manmade concept subject to change), but they also change in complex ways within a society 
over time. Thus, if we are comparing different states the phenomenon we investigate might 
not be the same across states. Even if we investigate a phenomenon in the same state in 
different time periods the phenomenon might not be the same. These are very real issues, 
and is something that the reader should keep in mind. The data sources and concepts used 
are well known, and an effort have been made to secure comparability. However, as the 
tradeoff implies, there is loss of context in this sort of analysis. For example, Germany of 1990 
is surely different from Germany of 1989.  
The last trade-off is related to independence of observations. A focus on temporal or 
spatial subunits can add observations that are not independent either from the initial set of 
observations, or from one another. This is a highly relevant critique when using longitudinal 
data, as measurements might be correlated over time (temporal dependence), and 
measurements within each country might be more similar than measurements in another 
country (spatial dependence). This issue can be mitigated through the choice of method, 
which the next section show. 
3.3 Multilevel models and longitudinal data 
A number of authors sees the use of multilevel models on longitudinal data as 
appropriate (Frees, 2004; Gelman & Hill, 2007; Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004; Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012). In a multilevel framework, we see each period of observation as the lowest 
level in a hierarchy. In this thesis, the model will only contain two levels: countries, and years 
of observations nested within each country. 
One of the reasons multilevel models are well equipped for longitudinal data is that it 
relaxes the independence assumption and allows for correlated error structures.  Multilevel 
models can handle both spatial and temporal dependence, which is the forth concern Collier 
et al. (2004) points to when increasing observations. A standard OLS regression assume that 
the observations are conditionally independent given the covariates. If the assumption is 
violated the regression will give standard errors of the parameter estimates that are too small, 
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which will inflate the t-values and alter the significance level. This increases the chance for 
obtaining spuriously ‘significant’ results. In a longitudinal framework, the multilevel model will 
correct for spatial dependence and it is possible to correct for temporal dependence by 
specifying a residual error structure. When such dependence are corrected for, we get more 
appropriate t-values and significance intervals (Luke (2004, pp. 21-22) , Hox (2010, pp. 4-5) , 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, p. 2)). 
Another reason why multilevel models are appropriate for longitudinal data is that it 
can easily handle missing data. The problem with missing data, except for the obvious loss of 
information and shrinkage of statistical power, is that missing data can produce biased results. 
If the data are missing at random (MAR) the bias will not be a problem using the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation (as long as the model is correctly specified). This means that the 
probability of missing data may only depend on the covariates or responses at previous/future 
occasions. They are not MAR if the probability of missing data depends on the response we 
would have observed if the response had not been missing (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, 
p. 278).  
Many traditional approaches to longitudinal data, such as repeated-measures MANOVA, 
are unable to easily handle unbalanced data. They often require balanced data, and list wise 
deletion is often used to achieve it. This means extra loss of data. Multilevel modeling is much 
more flexible and efficient, and it will use whatever data that are available (Luke, 2004, p. 64). 
3.3.1 Fixed vs random effects models 
There are two main estimators within the multilevel framework: fixed and random 
effects models. The fixed effects models are not biased by omitted country specific variables, 
but are generally less efficiently estimated than random effects models. The random effects 
models can be biased if there is an omitted country specific variable that both affects the level 
of an explanatory variable and the dependent variable. However, because it uses both 
between countries and within country information it is more efficient. Another advantage by 
the random effects models is that country level variables can be included. This is not possible 




The literature is full of advice when it comes to choosing estimator. As Gelman and Hill 
(2007, p. 245) writes: “A question that commonly arises is when to use fixed effects (…) and 
when to use random effects. The statistical literature is full of confusing and contradictory 
advice.” 
One of the more common methods to choose between the estimators is to use the 
Hausman test. The Hausman test is a statistical test for how severely biased the random 
effects estimator is, and an insignificant Hausman test is often interpreted to mean that the 
bias is insignificant and that a random effects estimator can be safely used. The test is not 
without criticism, and Clark and Linzer (2012) show how poorly the Hausman test perform in 
detecting and assessing the bias, and especially when the sample size is small. 
There are methods for overcoming the bias of random effects models. Bartels (2008) 
and Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012) show how the bias can be overcome by including 
country specific means of the explanatory variables in the model, and centering the time-
varying explanatory variables on the country specific mean variable. 
This approach separates the within country and between country effects of the 
variables, removes the correlation between the intercepts (omitted country level variables) 
and the time-varying variables, thus eliminating the bias resulting from this correlation. This 
approach produces numerically identical within effects as a fixed-effects model (Rabe-
Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 257). 
Using this approach removes the bias issue of the random effects model, and allows us 
to include country level variables. Another advantage of this approach is that it allows 
estimation of the between country parameters for the variables of interest, meaning that we 
can estimate both the effect of a change of a variable over time, but also how the level of that 
variable affects the level of inequality between countries. 
Using this approach do have costs, most of which is bared by the principle of parsimony. 
The inclusion of the mean explanatory variables doubles the amount of (time-varying) 
variables in the model, but the loss of parsimony is at least partially compensated through a 
more complete picture of the relationships, by giving both level effects and effects over time. 
In addition, this approach does not have the same advantage of efficiency as an unbiased 
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random effects model without country mean variables over the fixed effects approach, as the 
mean explanatory variables occupies degrees of freedom.  
Biases associated with the random effects approach is known as cluster-level 
confounding. The random effects estimator use a weighted average of between and within 
estimators. If the between and within effects are different, then the random effects model 
will give an estimate between these two estimators.  Issues arise when not including country 
mean variables and centering the within variables. The parameter estimates ignore level 
differences, and we get parameter estimates based on both change over time and the level of 
the variable between the countries. This issue is closely related to the ecological fallacy where 
level differences are used to explain changes5 (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 150). 
Although this approach eliminates the problem with cluster level confounding, it does 
not eliminate the inconsistency of the parameter estimates of endogenous time invariant 
variables (country-level variables) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 253). The problem is 
that time invariant variables (cluster means) could be correlated with the intercepts (the 
omitted country-level variables).  
This is analogous to the assumption that the time-varying variables (level one variables) 
are not correlated with the residuals at the lowest level. That is, that there are no omitted 
variables that correlates with both the error term (“all omitted variables” affecting the top 
decile income share) and the time-varying explanatory variables in the model. 
The problem with endogenous country-level variables could be partially overcome using 
the Hausman-Taylor method (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, pp. 253-257). However, the 
exact coefficients of the time invariant variables are not a primary concern for the research 
question. In addition, the Hausman-Taylor method is highly dependent on the specification.  
3.3.2 Model specification 
Formally the model used becomes: 
                                                     




𝑦𝑡𝑐 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑐 +  ∑ 𝛽
𝑊𝑥𝑡𝑐 +  𝜖𝑡𝑐 
𝛼𝑐 =  𝛾 + ∑ 𝛽
𝐵?̅?𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐 
𝛽𝑊𝑥𝑡𝑐 =  𝛽(𝑥𝑡𝑐 − ?̅?𝑐) 
Where αc is the country intercept, occtc is a time variable and the associated beta 
coefficient represents a linear time trend, βW represent the within parameters, ϵtc the error 
term for the individual year in a country, ϒ is the mean intercept controlled for the between 
variables, βB represents the between parameters and εc represents the country level residuals. 
When using this hierarchical equation structure it becomes clear that the model allows 
for different within (βW) and between (βB) effects. It also show that the mean explanatory 
variables only affects the intercepts (the level in 1980) and not the variation over time. By 
separating the level and variation, the model also removes potential bias associated with using 
a random effects model, as the level of the explanatory variables are not used when 
estimating variation over time. 
In the context of a longitudinal analysis, the within parameters represent the effect of a 
change in time, and the between parameters represent the level effect of the explanatory 
variable. This is useful, as the time invariant variables (the country means) cannot explain 
changes occurring over time. They can only explain why some countries have a higher or lower 
level of inequality.  
3.4 Special statistical concerns for longitudinal data: 
3.4.1 Trends, stationarity and autocorrelation 
The research question implies that there is a trend in the dependent variable. This could 
cause some problems for the regression estimation, especially if the variable is non-stationary. 
A series is non-stationary if the autocorrelation parameter (rho) is equal to or larger than one6. 
                                                     
6 ∈𝑖,𝑡= 𝜌 ∈𝑖,𝑡−1+  𝜂𝑖,𝑡, |ρ| ≥ 1 non-stationary process, |ρ| < 1 stationary process. Intuitively we can say that 
changes in a stationary variable, that is, a variable that wanders within some boundaries, cannot have a fixed 
linear relationship with a variable that wanders indefinitely far from its mean. 
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A non-stationary series is said to have a unit root. A series with a unit root will tend to wander 
far from its mean and the variance of the observations will grow larger and larger over time. 
In fact, it will tend to infinity as the number of observations go to infinity. 
 Beck and Katz (2011, p. 343) points out that proportions as a dependent variable have 
boundaries for how large their variance can become. In the case of the top decile income 
share, we know that the proportion of the total income must lie between 10% and 100%. Even 
though series with proportions are very persistent, they simply cannot be integrated of first 
order. 
To avoid making an inconsistent regression, explanatory variables must be integrated of 
the same order, meaning they have to be stationary as well. Some explanatory variables are 
stationary by the same logic as the income share (for example union density and 
unemployment rate) while some have to be transformed. See Data collection for details about 
the variables.  
Another problem with trends is autocorrelation, which will estimate standard errors 
that are too small, resulting in too much confidence to the estimates, and are frequent in time-
series and longitudinal data. We have autocorrelation when the residuals are correlated, 
which violates of the assumption of independent residuals. This is one of the concerns Collier 
et al. (2004) had with introducing temporal subunits. If left uncorrected we could easily do a 
spurious regression, where we observe a significant relationship even though it is purely due 
to chance. 
One way to eliminate autocorrelation is using a lagged dependent variable in the model. 
However, Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, pp. 272-273) show that lagged dependent 
variable models produces inconsistent parameter estimates as a result of the initial-conditions 
problem, which will say that we assume that the initial response (the top decile income share 
in 1981) is uncorrelated with the random intercept (all country level variables omitted). It 
seems highly unlikely that the income inequality in the countries in 1981 is uncorrelated with 
the level of inequality in the countries and all aspects of inequality left out in the model, which 
means that a lagged dependent variable will produce biased estimates. Plümper, Troeger, and 
Manow (2005, pp. 342-343) advocates the use of lagged residuals to eliminate 
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autocorrelation, as it produces consistent parameter estimates, in contrast to when a lagged 
dependent variable is included. 
When using a multilevel model it is possible to correct for autocorrelation by specifying 
a residual covariance structure. As there are missing data it is important to specify a 
covariance structure that is as close as possible to the ‘correct’ structure in order to get 
consistent parameter estimates and to improve the efficiency (meaning estimated standard 
errors closer to the correct values) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 298). 
3.4.2 Cross-sectional correlation 
In long panels one must also account for cross-sectional correlation (Frees, 2004, p. 286). 
Cross-sectional correlation is correlation because of linkage between countries. It could be 
that a global event affects the income distribution in all countries in the same year. This 
correlation can be estimated using a two-way error-components model (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012, pp. 435-436).  The resulting cross-sectional correlation was estimated to 
5.13e-21, indicating negligible cross-sectional correlation. An ordinary two-level random-
intercept model is therefore the pragmatic choice, as adding a residual covariance-structure 
is easier in these models. 
3.5 Model specifics and building process: 
3.5.1 Dynamics 
If dynamics are not taken into account, we are implicitly assuming that all variables only 
have an immediate impact on the income share. This seems unlikely to hold. Bartels (2008, 
pp. 13-14) advocate the use of a lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics when 
analyzing longitudinal data. 
By using a lagged dependent variable7, we are assuming that the effect of a variable 
declines geometrically and that the explanatory variables have identical persistent effects. 
                                                     




This is a strong assumption that might not be appropriate. In addition to this, as discussed in 
the section about autocorrelation, bias associated with the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable is undesirable. 
 Beck and Katz (2011, pp. 338-339) points to the possibility of including both a lagged 
dependent variable and potentially lagging independent variables to allow for both long 
lasting effects and immediate effects. This approach has the advantage of restricting the loss 
of observations, compared to fitting many lags, but it does not solve the issue of bias 
associated with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. 
To account for potential lasting effects a model containing three period lags were fitted, 
and insignificant lags were removed. When lags are included in the variable, we are not only 
regressing the dependent variable on the explanatory variable, but we are also regressing it 
on previous values of the explanatory variables. When three lags are included, the model 
allows the variables to have effects lasting up to three years after the initial change of the 
variable. The advantage of this procedure is that it does not assume identical dynamics of the 
explanatory variables (Plümper et al., 2005, p. 335) and it will not bias the coefficients. 
However, this comes at the cost of losing observations8, and potential long lag dynamics are 
not detected. 
3.5.2 Estimation 
When estimating a multilevel model the most commonly used method is maximum 
likelihood (ML). ML is generally robust, and produces estimates that are asymptotically 
efficient and consistent. With large samples, ML estimates are usually robust against mild 
violations of the assumptions, such as having non-normal errors (Hox, 2010, p. 40). 
However, restricted maximum likelihood (RML) is more realistic and should improve 
estimation, especially when the number of groups is small. The differences in practice are 
usually small. If the differences are nontrivial then RML usually performs better. There are two 
advantages associated with using ML: computations are generally easier and it offers the 
                                                     
8 We lose observations equal to the number of lags for each country at the start of the period, in addition to 
the same amount for each gap in the data of a country. 
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option to use an overall chi-square test based on the likelihood function to compare two 
models that differ in the fixed part.  
RML has more attractive qualities regarding the limited sample (relatively few 
countries). RML accounts for the degrees of freedom lost in estimating the lowest level 
parameters, which ML does not. In addition, the differences between the ML and RML 
estimates will grow larger as the number of parameters grow (Frees, 2004, p. 103). However, 
Frees (2004, p. 103) recommends using “ordinary” likelihoods for LR-tests, even when 
evaluating RML estimators.   
Regression results and the discussion will be based on result of RML estimation, except where 
indicated otherwise. However, ML was used when different models were fitted, and the LR-
test functioned as a model selection criterion. 
3.5.3 LR-test 
The maximum likelihood procedure produces a log likelihood statistic, which can be 
transformed to the “deviance”. The deviance is obtained by multiplying the model log 
likelihood by minus two, and it indicates how well the model fits the data. If two models are 
nested, the deviance of the two models can be used to compare their fit statistically.  
A lower deviance always implies a better fit, and the model with more parameters will 
always have a lower deviance. The LR-test helps us to test if the difference in deviance, and 
hence the parameter(s) of interest, are statistically significant. 
The difference of the deviance is (approximately) distributed as a chi-square statistic 
with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in parameters estimated in the models. If the 
difference in the deviances exceeds the critical chi-square value, the model with all the 
parameters fits data significantly better than the reduced model. 
As Stata gives the log likelihood and not the deviance the likelihood ratio test statistic is 
computed as follows: 2*(LL (full model) – LL (reduced model)). If this statistic should exceed 
the critical chi-square value given the parameter difference, the full model is accepted (Luke 
(2004, p. 34) , Hox (2010, p. 47) , Frees (2004, p. 99)). 
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3.5.4 Residuals and covariance structure 
The likelihood is based on assuming multivariate normality of the total residuals. Even if 
this assumption is violated, point estimates of regression coefficients will remain consistent, 
as long as the fixed part of the model is correctly specified. The same applies to the model 
based standard errors, as long as the covariance structure is correctly specified (Rabe-Hesketh 
& Skrondal, 2012, p. 298). As long as the distribution of the total residuals is symmetric, ML 
not only produces consistent regression coefficients, but is also unbiased in small samples, 
even if the covariance structure is incorrectly specified. However, this is conditional on no 
missing data or that the missing data are random. Since there are missing data in the analysis, 
finding the best residual structure to reduce the downward bias of the standard errors is of 
interest. 
The default residual covariance structure in Stata is independent, meaning that all 
residuals are independent and identically distributed with one common variance. In 
longitudinal analysis, this is inappropriate due to autocorrelation. As a result, multiple 
alternative residual covariance structures were tested. All covariance structures that are 
constant across subjects can be obtained by imposing restrictions on the unstructured model 
and are hence nested in the unstructured model. Therefore, we could conduct a likelihood-
ratio test to compare a structured model to the unstructured model (Rabe-Hesketh & 
Skrondal, 2012, p. 322). An unstructured model has n(n + 1)/2 parameters, where n are the 
number of occasions (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 298). This is a huge matrix, and is in 
practice not possible to estimate in this data material. 
Fortunately, all models are nested in the unstructured model, and the identity (called 
independent in Stata when talking about the residual covariance) structure is nested in all 
models (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012, p. 297). This means that we can reverse the 
procedure and test the independent model against structured models.  
 Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2012, p. 325) recommends selecting a residual structure 
before selecting the mean structure (fixed-part) of the model. This is because the inferences 
for the regression coefficients depend on the specific residual structure.  They recommend 
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first adding all potentially relevant explanatory variables, then find the best fitting residual 
structure and keep the chosen residual structure when refining the model. 
The modeling process is partly9 following a bottom-up approach as suggested in the 
literature (Gelman & Hill, 2007, p. 69; Hox, 2010, p. 56; Luke, 2004, p. 23). 
(1) A model with all the explanatory variables, country means at level 2 
(country-level) and the country mean centered variable at level 1 (occasion-level), was 
fitted. Next, the residual structure were chosen. 
(2) To account for dynamics, three-year lags were included for all within 
variables. The insignificant lags at 10% were removed. 
(3) Cross-level interactions of country mean and the corresponding within 
variable were tested and insignificant interactions were removed. Other potential level 
1 and cross-level interactions were tested. 
The reason for exploring potential cross-level interactions between the country mean 
variables and the corresponding within variables is that there might be stronger or weaker 
effects depending on the average level of the variable.  
  
                                                     
9 The usual step after fitting the level 1 structure is to test for random slopes before testing for cross-level 
interactions. However, as LaHuis and Ferguson (2009) points out, there is generally low power for tests of slope 
variation. The lack of power can give insignificant random slopes, even though the model is capable of estimate 
cross-level interactions.  
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4 Data collection 
This chapter describes the data collection process. It provides reasoning behind the 
choice of each variable and issues related to the choice. The chapter ends with a discussion of 
the case selection, statistical significance testing and generalization.  
The data used have been collected from widely recognized sources. Data on each 
variable have been collected from the same source in order to maintain comparability. Even 
though the sources are widely recognized, there may be different flaws. It is assumed that 
eventual flaws are minimal, and that they have a negligible impact on the results.  
4.1 Income share 
Measure 
Inequality is a complex subject, and there are varieties of commonly used measures to 
capture the concept. Two of the more commonly used measures are the Gini-coefficient and 
inter decile ratios. 
The Gini-coefficient is a synthetic measure that builds on the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz 
curve is a curve that plots the income share of each percentile of the income distribution. In 
a utopian society the line would be a straight line (each percentile have 1 percent of the 
income). Inequality is thus defined as the curve’s deviation from this straight line. The Gini 
index is the area between the Lorenz curve and the straight line as a percentage of the entire 
area beneath the straight line (Jantzen & Volpert, 2012, p. 825).  
The strength of the Gini coefficient lies in its ability to summarize the income distribution 
in one index value. The Gini coefficient makes technical sense, but it is an artificial statistical 
measure that can be difficult to interpret. Piketty (2014, p. 267) criticizes the Gini coefficient 
for giving an abstract and sterile view of inequality. Also, when we use the Gini index we 
simplify matters and ignore that there are different social realities, economic and political 
significance of inequality at different levels at the income distribution (Piketty, 2014, p. 266). 
Interdecile ratios is the ratio between a given percentile and another. The most 
frequently used is the ratio between P90 (the lower income threshold for belonging to the 
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upper 10% distribution) and P10 (the upper income threshold for belonging in the lowest 10% 
of the distribution). 
The ratio gives more information about how skewed the distribution is compared to the 
Gini coefficient. However, the ratio ignores what is going on in the upper and the lowest 
decile, and ignores how much of the total income that the upper decile claims. It is also highly 
dependent on the exact threshold, which will vary depending on for example what period of 
work (monthly, weekly, annual etc.) the ratio is based on. The interdecile ratio could for 
example be quite high even though the bottom 50% of the labor income distribution draws a 
fairly stable share of the income from labor (Piketty, 2014, pp. 267-269). 
 Piketty (2014) promotes the use of deciles (or other breakdowns of the income 
distribution into percentages), justified by comparability, interpretation and transparency. His 
fundamental goal is to compare structures of inequality in societies that are different across 
both time and space. Different societies use different words and concepts when they refer to 
social groups. Even though the concepts of deciles and centiles are rather abstract they allows 
us to compare inequalities that would otherwise be incomparable, using a common language 
that should in principle be acceptable to everyone (Piketty, 2014, p. 252). 
Interpreting the top decile income share is easier to interpret than for example the Gini-
coefficient. While the Gini-coefficient gives a number for the total inequality, which is a highly 
abstract and technical value hard to grasp, the top decile income share tells how much of the 
total income the top ten percent earners get. 
“The way one tries to measure inequality is never neutral” (Piketty, 2014, p. 270), and 
the top decile income share is no exception. It ignores the distribution of income in the top 
decile itself, and in the bottom 90%. It is also a relative measure, and as such, there is more 
than one way it can change. The share might increase because of the top earners earning more 
while the rest of the population have a stable income as a group. It may also increase because 
the bottom 90% earn less, while the income of the top ten percent is stable. A third possibility 
is that both groups experience an increase in income, but that the top ten percent gains more 




Data on the top deciles’ gross income share were collected from the World Top 
Income Database (WTID). See the Appendix for variable names and codes used for each 
country. 
Canada has data on both the category “Top 10% income share” and ”Top 10% income 
share-LAD”. The solution was to use only the data from the LAD variable for two reasons: First, 
using only one measure ensure internal consistency (an alternative could for example have 
been to use the mean of any overlapping years). Secondly, when choosing a single variable, 
the LAD-variable offers most data. United Kingdom also has data from two sources, but no 
overlapping years. There appears to be a level difference between the two series, but the 
trend appears to be consistent. Using both series, a sensitivity analysis was conducted 
between the model with all data and on a model where the first series is set to missing (see 
Diagnostics and model specification). 
The data are estimated from historical tax statistics. As the data are based on reported 
income, it may be that that they do not represent the real income. There may be both tax 
evasion and tax avoidance, likely to be correlated with the tax level (Piketty & Saez, 2006, pp. 
200-201).  
However, Piketty and Saez (2006, p. 200) affirms that their main motivation for the 
database came from dissatisfaction with existing income inequality databases. It is therefore 
expected that even though the data based on the tax statistics are not perfect, they offer more 
homogeneity across time and space than earlier databases. 
The income share variable was converted to, and used, on the logarithmic scale. The 
reasoning is that the income share by construction cannot be negative. According to Gelman 
and Hill (2007, p. 59) it commonly makes sense to take the logarithm of outcomes that are all-
positive. One reason for this is that a regression model imposes no constraint that would force 
the predictions to be all-positive on the original scale. When we take the logarithm of the 
outcome, make predictions on the log scale and transform back, the predictions are 
necessarily positive. 
The interpretation changes with the transformation. It is hard to imagine a strict linear 
association between the explanatory variables and the top income share, as is assumed if the 
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raw income share is used. It makes more sense that a unit change in for example top statutory 
tax rate to have a proportional relationship with the top income share rather than a fixed 
linear relationship. 
The income share variable is also somewhat skewed and logarithmic transformations 
are convenient means of transforming a skewed variable into one that is more approximately 
normal (Benoit, 2011, p. 2). Normality of the dependent variable is strictly not an assumption 
(just normality of the residuals) but taken together with the benefit of all-positive estimates 
and a more realistic interpretation the log transformation makes sense. 
4.2 Top statutory tax rate 
Measure 
To account for the top tax rates the top statutory tax rates are used. The top statutory 
tax rates are the tax rates as written in law. However, marginal tax rates (the tax payable on 
an additional currency unit of earnings) and average tax rates could be used. 
The marginal tax rates is the rate that in theory should affect the incentives to work. The 
statutory tax rates are only one of more components that make up the marginal tax rates (tax 
deductions will make discrepancies between the statutory and marginal rates). However, 
marginal tax rates involve complex calculations that rely on a variety of assumptions, making 
comparison difficult (even over time within a country). The statutory tax rates are defined by 
legislation and do not require computations (OECD, 2012, p. 28). 
The statutory tax rates have some advantages in international comparison. 
Policymakers cannot directly adjust marginal tax rates and changing the statutory tax rates is 
a powerful policy tool to indirectly modify incentives to work. In that manner, the statutory 
tax rate is a more direct measure of the actual policy and the policy tool. 
The top statutory tax rates also have some weaknesses. First, they do not show the 
actual marginal top rates and are therefore only an approximation to the incentive driving 
marginal tax. Second, the tax brackets vary across both time and countries. Since this thesis 
investigates the top decile income share, the proportion of the top decile actually affected by 
the top tax bracket also varies across time and countries. Third, and related, tax progressivity 
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varies across time and countries. The progressivity, or the degree to which tax rates increases 
with the income, is related to the tax bracket thresholds, the number of brackets and the 
difference between the tax rates in the brackets. Tax progressivity will presumably affect the 
incentives for workers in the bottom 90% to work, and is therefore relevant for the top decile 
income share. However, this is information not provided by the top statutory tax rates. 
While acknowledging that the top statutory tax rate is not a perfect measure of tax 
policy and actual marginal top tax rates, it is generally accepted as a relevant indicator of 
taxation in international comparison (OECD, 2012, p. 28). 
Data 
Data on the top statutory tax rate in the period 2000-2013 were collected from OECDs 
Tax Database: “Table I.7. Top statutory personal income tax rate and top marginal tax rates 
for employees” the variable “Top tax rates” under the broader category “Top statutory 
personal income tax rates”.   
This database only contains data for the period 2000-2013. However, there are also 
some “historical tables” on OECDs webpages (OECD) that contains the information necessary 
to extend the top statutory tax rates series to include the period 1981-1999. In extending the 
series the explanatory annex (OECD, 2014) and the information in the spreadsheets were 
used. The general formula is: top central tax rate + top sub-central tax rate. Some countries 
have special surtaxes, which are also applied.  
A special note concerning Switzerland: when calculating the top statutory tax rate the 
Tax Database uses the highest marginal central tax rate on Switzerland. In this thesis the 
highest average tax rate is used, which is 11.5% by law on the federal level. The data used in 
the whole time period (1981-2013) is thus adjusted for this. Country specific details 
concerning the calculation on the top statutory tax rates for the period 1981-1999 are listed 
in the Appendix. 




While unions play an important part in the collective bargaining, the union density does 
not tell the whole story when it comes to people covered by the bargained agreements. 
Workers who are not union members may in fact be covered by the terms and conditions of 
union contracts by extension and enlargement. While a high rate of unionization leads to a 
high coverage rate, the opposite is not necessarily true (Traxler, 1994, p. 167). 
This makes union density a crude measure of collective bargaining coverage. A more 
accurate picture could be painted by using the collective bargaining coverage rate. However, 
available data on the coverage rate is partial and fragmented. In addition, while the extension 
may increase wages for non-union members, it is unclear how the extension affects the union 
bargaining power. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the bargaining power of any union is related to its 
member base. Members pay initiation fees, monthly dues and so on. More members means 
more resources for financing the activities previously mentioned in Unions and collective 
bargaining coverage. The effectiveness of the strike bargaining tool should also be closely 
related to the union member base. First, the more financial resources the unions have the 
more unionized workers the union can afford to take out to strike, and the longer the strike 
can go on thereby imposing a higher potential cost for the employer. Second, a higher 
unionization rate increases the rate of potential strikers within a firm or sector. 
If a higher union density rate increases the bargaining position for the unions, then the 
higher union rate should increase both unionized and some of the non-unionized wages. The 
effect is two-fold: more workers covered by the bargained agreements, and more bargaining 
power. Extensions would only increase the amount of workers covered, but would not 
increase the bargaining power of the unions.  
The collective bargaining coverage rate would in reality include two distinct groups, and 
using the collective bargaining coverage rate would treat all covered (either by being a union 
member or covered by extension) as one group, potentially diluting the bargaining power 
aspect. The effect of the collective bargaining coverage rate would probably depend on the 
proportion of the covered that are unionized. Consequently, it makes sense to treat unionized 
workers and workers covered by extensions as two groups. Optimally, we would have one 
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variable as union density rate and one as the proportion of workers that are covered by 
extensions (coverage rate minus density rate). However, as mentioned, good data on 
coverage rates for the sample in question is hard to come by. A variable that captures 
extension mechanisms are included to account for any agreement benefits enjoyed by non-
unionized workers. 
Data 
The data on labor union density were collected from the OECD database. The variable 
name in the database is: “Trade Union Density”. It is the ratio of wage and salary earners that 
are trade union members to the total number of wage and salary earners. The data are mainly 
based on survey data and supplemented with administrative data.  
Data on the extension score were collected from Visser (2013). The variable is named 
“Ext” in the database and is: ‘mandatory extension of collective agreements by public law to 
non-organized firms.’ The categories are as follows:  
3: extension is virtually automatic and more or less general (including enlargements). 
2:  extensions is used in many industries, but there are thresholds and Ministers can 
(and sometimes do) decide not to extend (clauses in) collective agreements. 
1:  extensions is rather exceptional, used in some industries only, because of absence of 
sector agreements, very high thresholds (supermajorities of 60% or more, public policy 
criteria, etc.), and/or resistance of employers.  




Trade and trade openness have been measured in different ways in different studies. 
Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) and Reuveny and Li (2003), for example, use the sum 
of imports and exports as a share of GDP as an indicator of economic trade openness. Mahler 
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et al. (1999) take a different approach, separating trade penetration into import as a 
percentage of (sectoral share of) GDP and export as a percentage of (sectoral share of) GDP.    
As indicated in Trade and economic openness there are theoretical reasons for 
expecting different effects from export and import. I therefore find Mahler et al. (1999)’s 
arguments for treating the import and export separately appealing. 
Economic openness indicates that we are measuring the import/export/trade in relation 
to the rest of the economy. The reason for using the measures as a percent of GDP is to take 
into account the size of the rest of the economy. The larger the import/export/trade as a 
percent of GDP, the more open the economy is. An alternative measure could be the 
import/export/trade in value, or the annual percentage growth of the value. However, this 
would only measure the import/export/trade, and would not take into account the openness 
aspect. 
Data 
Data on exports and imports as a percentage of GDP were collected from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The dataset used is: “Goods and 
Services (BPM5): Trade openness indicators, annual, 1980-2013”, and the flow of export and 
import as a percent of GDP is used. 
4.5 Population 
Measure 
Kuznets (1955, p. 10) argued that demographics could reduce the income distribution. 
The argument is that the cumulative effect of savings raise the income for a progressively 
diminishing proportion of the total population. In other words, the rich becomes richer, but 
they are becoming a relatively smaller group of the total population. 
There are also reasons to control for the population level. Small countries, for instance, 
tend to have a more open economy than larger countries. It is therefore of relevance to 
control for this, when the level of trade is of interest. 
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The population is the chosen indicator, but other measures could have been used, such 
as the labor force size. This could be a better measure given that it measures the economically 
active population plus the population actively seeking employment, but it does not include 
individuals out of the labor force (discouraged workers and people not seeking employment). 
A growing labor force could thus be due to workers entering the labor force after being 
discouraged. As such, an increase in the labor force is not necessarily reflecting an actual 
growth of the population (or working-age population), but rather an improved economic 
sentiment.  
There are three population variables in the model. First, there is a level variable. This is 
the logarithm of the mean population size of the countries in the period. Second, the 
percentage growth of the population was used as a time varying population variable. Third, 
as with the other time varying variables, an average population growth rate in the period had 
to be included to account for potential country-level confounding. 
Data 
Population data were gathered from the OECDs dataset “Population”. “Population 
(hist5) All ages”. This variable is the basis for the country mean log population in the period. 
Data on the population growth rate were collected from OECDs dataset “ALFS Summary 
tables”, subject “Population growth rate”. The variable is the basis for the country mean 
population growth rate and the within population growth rate. 
4.6 GDP 
Measure 
According to Kuznets (1955, p. 10) a dynamic economy should decrease the income 
inequality. In such a society, technological change is rampant and wealth is becoming less 
important as new industries are being born.  
A commonly used indicator for economic development is the gross domestic product 
(GDP). This is not a measure without criticism (see Stiglitz (2012, pp. 228-232)). Both gross 
national product and national income could have been used, but due to the availability of data 
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and the convention of using GDP (it will be easier to compare these results with earlier and 
future research), the GDP was used for a proxy of economic development.    
Data 
Data on national GDP were collected from the IMF. “Gross domestic product per capita, 
current prices” measured in US dollars. These data are the basis for the country mean log GDP, 
which is the average logarithm of the GDP for each country in the period. Data on the GDP 
growth rate were collected from OECD “1.Gross domestic product (GDP)”, transaction “Gross 
domestic product (expenditure approach), measure “Growth rate”. These form the basis for 
the country mean GDP growth – the average growth rate of the GDP in the period. It also 
forms the basis for the within GDP growth rate variable, which is centered on the country 
mean GDP growth rate. 
4.7 Unemployment 
Measure 
Unemployment indicates how the supply and demand for labor is balanced at the given 
time. High unemployment indicates an oversupply of labor, which tightens the competition 
for the jobs, presumably resulting in a downward pressure on wages. Krugman (1994, p. 30) 
suggests that the lowest “productivity”-segments (lowest paid workers) of the labor force 
might have higher unemployment than higher “productivity”-segments (highest paid 
workers). If this is true, a high unemployment rate should hurt the lowest paid workers more 
than the high paid workers, in turn contributing to higher inequality. 
The unemployment rate seems a natural choice of unemployment, but the measure 
does not include discouraged workers – people who wants to work, but is not actively 
searching for employment. The labor force participation rate is an alternative measure that 
could have been used, but this measure ignores the difference between the unemployed 
(those actively searching for work) and people who does not want to work.  The 
unemployment rate is used, as it seems like a milder violation to ignore the discouraged 
workers than to treat the proportion of the population not wanting or being able to work with 




The data were collected from the International Monetary Fund’s “The World Economic 
Outlook Database” (October 2014 Edition). The country mean unemployment is the average 
unemployment rate for the country in the period, and the within unemployment is the 
unemployment centered on the country mean variable. 
4.8 Case selection and generalizations 
The countries in the analysis are all members of OECD, and it would be tempting to view 
the countries as a sample from the broader universe of OECD member states. However, the 
sample in this thesis was not a result of randomized draws or equivalent procedures. They 
were selected from two criteria: 1) being a member of the OECD and 2) having data on the 
top 10% labor income share in the WTID in the period 1980-2013.  
The sample does not follow the assumptions of randomized draws and independence, 
and generalizations out of the sample would violate the very foundation of statistical 
generalization. There could be confounding reasons for why the countries are included in the 
WTID, or that the other OECD countries are not included. If this is the case, then the results of 
the analysis would not representative for the broader OECD universe.  
The population under investigation is the 19 countries in the period 1981-2011. If there 
had been no missing data the population could have been claimed. When the data covers the 
population, there is no larger entity for which generalization is relevant. Not all researchers 
use statistical tests in these situations. However, Rubin (1985) advocate the use of significance 
even with population data. He argues that social researchers often have the broader purpose 
of linking their findings to theoretical analyses, and therefore must address whether the 
explanatory variables helps explain why the differences among the subpopulations exist. 
Significance testing would be required in order to determine the likelihood that the observed 
differences among subpopulations could have been generated by a random division of the 
population into subpopulations. With the results of the significance test one is in a better 
position to discuss the credibility of the notion that explanatory variables helps explain the 
differences in the dependent variable.  
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Rubin (1985) also argues that if one has missing data, then the population cannot be 
claimed, and significance tests would be appropriate. This is central for this thesis, as there 
are missing data. The statistical hypothesis tests are an attempt to generalize the relationships 
to the whole period under investigation, in all the countries in the analysis (the population). 
This is appropriate if the missing data are missing at random. If the data are MAR, then the 
data available can be seen as a randomized sample of the years under investigation in the 
countries, and the statistical conditions for generalizations are met. It is worth noting that the 
generalization is only appropriate for the total period under investigation in the countries 
included in the analysis. 
At a higher level of abstraction, significance testing is appropriate because populations 
are always evolving. If research is done in connection to problems in the hope of generating 
implication for future action then significance testing should be used as any population is no 
more than a sample of that population at any given point in time.  
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5 Descriptive statistics 
This chapter presents  numerical and graphical description of the variables. The chapter 
starts with describing the dependent variable, next a description of the explanatory variables 
follows. The chapter ends by presenting the correlation matrix and discussing the effects of 
multicollinearity. 
5.1 Top decile income share variable 
Conducting a meaningful longitudinal study requires some variation in the dependent 
variable. After all, what is the point in investigating possible explanations for variation in the 
dependent variable if it does not vary (King et al., 1994, p. 129)? 
Following Beck and Katz (2011) a box plot of the top decile income share and a time-
series plot of the variable is examined to see if there is sufficient variation within and between 
the countries. 
 
Figure 6 Box plot of the top decile income share by country 
Figure 6 reveals significant differences regarding both the level of the top decile income 
share and the variation within the different countries. Some countries show little variation of 
their top decile income share, for example Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Switzerland, while other countries such as Korea and the United States show great variability 
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over the period. Some countries show a persistently lower level on the top decile income 
share in the period than other countries. Denmark and Sweden, for example, have persistently 
lower levels than for example the United States. The plot makes it clear that there are some 
observations that is relatively far away from the other observations in the countries, notably 
in Denmark, Norway, Portugal and Spain. 
Figure 7 below show how the top decile gross income share has evolved from 1980 up 
to 2013 in the 19 countries in this analysis. There is a trend toward a higher income share in 
most countries. However, Spain has actually had a declining trend, after an initial increase in 
the 1980s. It should be noted that each country is scaled differently. 
 
Figure 7 Top decile income share 1980-2013 
We can see that there are different paths within each decade. The US and UK had a 
rising trend in the 80s, while Norway and New Zealand had declining trends. In the 1990s, 
Canada and Italy had increasing trends, while Spain and New Zealand had developments that 
are more inconclusive. In the 2000s, US continued to increase the share, as did Ireland, while 
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Spain reduced it and several other countries were quite stable. Overall, the development 
paths show substantial diversity.  
Figure 7 also makes it clear that there are some missing values. There is, for example, 
no data on Finland before 1990, Korea have no observations between 1985 and 1995, and the 
Netherlands only have two observations in the period 1980-1988. 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of the raw income variable. 
Table 1 Descriptive: Top decile income share 
 
There are 531 observations in total on the income share variable. The top decile income 
share in the sample varies from 18.77% to 47.76%, which is to say that across time and 
countries the observed average top decile income varies from 1.9 times the average income 
in the country in the given year, to 4.8 times the average income.  The mean of 32.1 tells us 
that the average income share across both time and countries are 32.1% of the total labor 
income, and the average income in the top decile is 3.2 times the average income for the total 
population.  
Looking at the differences within (over time) and between (across countries) we see that 
the standard deviation between the countries is larger than the standard deviation within, 
suggesting that, in the period under investigation, the difference across countries with respect 
to the top decile income share is greater than differences over time within the countries.  
 
Figure 8 Top decile income share in the sample 
 Mean St.dev. Min Max Observations 
Overall 32.1 5.23 18.77 47.76 531 
Between  4.24 25.12 40.66 19 
Within  2.94 18.05 42.65 27.95 
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Figure 8 above displays graphical how much of the total labor income that the top decile 
claims in the cases of the lowest, average and the highest income share in the sample. It is 
clear that here are substantial differences between the three scenarios.  
5.1.1 Outliers 
For Portugal, the outliers are in the early 1980s. There are missing data between these 
and up to 1989. If these are truly outliers, or just the start of an increasing trend is unclear. 
Knowing that the trends in the other south European countries (France, Italy and Spain) were 
a steep increase it seems likely that the outliers are outliers because of missing data, rather 
than being generated by another mechanism. The outliers for Spain seems to be a result of a 
period of higher income share rather than measurement issues. 
We can see sudden spikes and trend breaks in Denmark in 2009 and 2010, in 1986 and 
1987 in Australia, in 2000 in the Netherlands, in 1998 and 1999 in New Zealand, in 1990 in 
Sweden and in 2005 in Norway. There is also a small spike in the UK in 1990, which is related 
to the series break discussed in Income share. As it turns out, the Netherlands also has a break 
in the series between 2000 and 2001 (Salverda, 2013). 
There were significant tax changes in Australia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 
years close to the observed spikes in the income shares (Agell, Englund, & Södersten, 1995; 
Reinhardt & Steel, 2006; The Danish Ministry of Taxation, 2009; Thoresen, 2009). Saez, 
Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) discuss several behavioral changes associated with changing the 
tax system, some of which relates to income shifting and tax avoidance. This indicates that 
the observed spikes might not be because of ‘secular’ distributional changes, but rather a 
consequence of the tax reforms. Indeed, some of these tax reforms had a stated goal reducing 
incentives for tax avoidance. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the changes in the tax 
systems could potentially explain the spikes observed in the income share.  
The relevance of these observations for the analysis could be discussed, as they are, at 
least partly, related to a phenomenon (tax reform) outside the scope of this thesis. The same 
goes for the Netherlands and the UK, as the break in the series introduce a level shock. The 
observations will affect the parameter estimates, and since they are not caused by the 
phenomenon of interest here, their impact will give skewed (biased) results. 
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The model found in Results is estimated using all available data. However, in Diagnostics 
and model specification the issue of outliers will be further discussed. In addition, models 
excluding the “outliers” are estimated to check for their influence, and to check if any results 
are substantially altered. 
5.2 Explanatory variables 
Table 2 Descriptive: all variables 
 
Table 2 displays the overall, between and within variance of the variables in the 
regression models. We can see that the country mean variables (cm_*) show no variation over 
time (within), and that the variables centered on their country mean, (w_*), have close to no 
variation between countries.  
The country mean variable all have 646 observations (N), over 19 countries (n) and 34 
years (T). When looking at the ‘within’ variables it is clear that the mean time span for the 
variables varies. The GDP growth and unemployment rate are the only within variables with 
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all observations, while within top statutory tax rate has a mean of 32 observations per country. 
This is due to the tax data starting in 1981, and that Korea is not included in OECD’s historical 
tax tables. The first observation is also lost when calculating the import and export growth. 
Labor union density data stops in various years after 2010, and starts in 1981 for Spain. The 
data on extensions ends in 2012 for most countries, 2011 for Korea and the United States. 
Looking at the country specific mean tax rate in the period (cm_tax) we can see that the 
mean top statutory tax rate in the period varies between 39.99% and 63.57% across countries, 
with a mean of the country mean top tax rate of 51.36%. The top tax rate over time varies 
between -14.84 and 33.86. That is, the country with the largest negative deviation of the tax 
rate from the period mean has a negative deviation of 14.84 percentage point from the 
country’s average top tax rate in the period. The country with the largest positive deviation 
has a deviation of 33.86 percentage point over the period mean top tax rate.  




Figure 9 Evolution of variables over time 
The top statutory tax rate and the union density show clear decreasing trends in the 
period, while the import and export variables have an increasing trend. As previously noted, 
the tax and labor union density variables cannot have a unit root by the same logic that applies 
to the income share. They cannot go below zero percent or higher than a hundred percent. 
The seemingly deterministic trend observed here is a result of the relatively short period of 
observation, and the long cycles of the variables. This may pose some problems concerning 
the standard errors. However, such problems should be mitigated by the choice of residual 
structure. There is also trends in the import and export variables; however, they not have any 
theoretical boundary. There is most likely a real limit. As with the tax and labor union density 
variables, choosing the correct residual structure can mitigate some of the problems 
concerning the standard errors. In addition to this, the alternative models introduced in 
Alternative measures and methods address the issue further. 
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The remaining variables show cyclical behavior, but there does not appear to be any 
problems concerning deterministic trends. It is worth noting that relatively few countries have 
actually changed extension classification in this period. 
Table 3 displays the casewise correlation matrix for all the variables.  
Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 
There is much that can be said about the correlation matrix. I will limit my discussion 
and notes to the numbers highlighted in red. These correlations are above 0.6 in absolute 
value, and the reason for highlighting them is that they are so large that they will affect 
estimation of the standard errors. Due to the high correlation between some explanatory 
variables, the model has a hard time distinguishing the relative “effects” of the variables, 
inflating the standard error of the parameter estimates. A correlation of 0.6 yields a 25% 
higher standard error, and a correlation of 0.9 inflates the standard errors by 129% (Skog, 
2004, p. 288). 
The most severe correlation is between the import and export variables. The country 
mean import and export variables show a correlation value of 0.98. The within import and 
within export variables show a correlation of 0.89. There are also high correlations between 
the import and export variables and the trade variables. This is not surprising as trade it is the 
sum of the two. However, they do not appear in the same models, so any correlation between 
the trade and import/export is irrelevant. 
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Most of the high correlations are observed between country mean variables. This is 
particularly severe given the number of countries are only 19 (the number of units decrease 
the standard errors). Although the difference in the level of inequality is both important and 
interesting, the primary concern in this thesis is temporal change. Therefore, high correlations 
between country mean variables are not that crucial. 
The within tax, within labor union density, within export, within import and within trade 
all substantially correlate with the time variable. The correlation with the time variable was 
clear when inspecting figure 9 (page 47). 
It is worth noting that the correlation between the within variables and the country 
means are not completely gone. This is a result of missing data. As it is the casewise correlation 
matrix, cases without a value on all variables are dropped in the matrix, and this is tilting the 
correlation between the country mean and within variables. They are averaged using all of the 
data. When data points drop out, the mean value calculated with all data points is not identical 
to the mean value of all the data included in the matrix. This causes a slight correlation 
between some of the country mean variables and the within variables. The highest correlation 
is between the country mean GDP growth rate and the within country GDP growth rate, with 
a correlation of -0.06. This is a low residual correlation, and is expected to cause negligible 
bias to the parameter estimates. This is supported by a Hausman test, and by visual inspection 
of the difference between the parameters in the mixed and fixed models included in 





The chapter starts with introducing technical hypotheses. Next, a regression model is 
introduced, and a primer for interpreting the parameters is given. Following next is a 
discussion of the hypotheses in light of the model. 
6.1 Hypotheses revisited 
In Theoretical and conceptual framework a set of general hypotheses were introduced. 
This section introduces a set of empirical hypotheses. The hypotheses in question are then 
tested using a regression model.  
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between the top statutory tax rate and 
the top decile income share 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the labor union density rate and 
the top decile income share 
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between the extension of collective 
agreements and the top decile income share 
H4: There is a significant positive interaction between labor union density and import as 
a percentage of GDP 
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between the growth of imports as a 
percent of GDP and the top decile income share 
H6: There is a significant negative relationship between the growth of exports as a 
percent of GDP and the top decile income share 
6.2 Regression model 
This is a log-linear model, meaning a unit increase in the associated variable multiplies 
the expected top decile income share by 𝑒?̂?. When the coefficient is small, we can use the 
approximation 𝑒?̂? ≈ 1 + ?̂?. This leads to the approximation 100 ∗ ?̂? = expected percentage 
change in the top decile income share for a unit change in the associated variable (Benoit, 
2011, p. 4). 
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The “cm_logpop” and “cm_logGDP” variables are the logarithm of the mean population 
and GDP over the period, meaning a slightly different interpretation. The parameters are 
elasticities, and should be interpreted as the expected percentage change in the top decile 
income share when the variable changes by one percent. Increasing the explanatory variable 
by 1% multiplies the expected top decile income share by 𝑒?̂?∗log (1.01). 
The model below is built on all available observations, and the process leading up to this 
model is described in Model specifics and building process. 
The coefficient is the average difference in the top decile income share when comparing 
two years (the lowest level of the analysis) that differ by 1 in the relevant explanatory variable 
while being identical in all other explanatory variables (Gelman & Hill, 2007, p. 34). 
The expected (or estimated) effect, the phrasing used when describing the model, refers 
to the average difference when comparing two units (years) when these units differ by 1 
measurement unit in the explanatory variable, controlled for all other variables in the model. 
Table 4 Regression using all observations 
                                                                               
       _cons     .7635445    2.08583     0.37   0.714    -3.324607    4.851696
              
   c.w_labor     .0001137   .0000545     2.09   0.037     6.84e-06    .0002205
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax     .0001107   .0000444     2.49   0.013     .0000237    .0001977
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0004324   .0002044    -2.12   0.034     -.000833   -.0000319
         L2.    -.0004824   .0002257    -2.14   0.033    -.0009247   -.0000402
         L1.    -.0005781   .0002313    -2.50   0.012    -.0010314   -.0001248
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0261798   .0090022     2.91   0.004     .0085359    .0438238
      cm_ext    -.0026757   .0239269    -0.11   0.911    -.0495715    .0442201
     w_labor    -.0069233     .00184    -3.76   0.000    -.0105296    -.003317
    cm_labor    -.0008357   .0029683    -0.28   0.778    -.0066534    .0049819
     w_popgr    -.0050979   .0030404    -1.68   0.094    -.0110569    .0008611
    cm_popgr    -.1717673   .1442111    -1.19   0.234    -.4544158    .1108811
   cm_logpop     .0326228   .0526405     0.62   0.535    -.0705506    .1357962
       w_exp     9.24e-06   .0007547     0.01   0.990      -.00147    .0014885
      cm_exp    -.0162247   .0103775    -1.56   0.118    -.0365644    .0041149
       w_imp     .0005072   .0008201     0.62   0.536    -.0011001    .0021145
      cm_imp     .0199159   .0109835     1.81   0.070    -.0016114    .0414432
      w_unem    -.0001219   .0008243    -0.15   0.882    -.0017375    .0014937
     cm_unem     .0150219   .0084189     1.78   0.074    -.0014789    .0315227
     w_GDPgr     .0015166   .0003943     3.85   0.000     .0007437    .0022895
    cm_GDPgr     .0683415   .0525878     1.30   0.194    -.0347288    .1714117
   cm_logGDP     .2403548   .2512164     0.96   0.339    -.2520203    .7327299
       w_tax    -.0067094   .0024342    -2.76   0.006    -.0114803   -.0019385
      cm_tax    -.0103077   .0042173    -2.44   0.015    -.0185734    -.002042
         occ     .0032779   .0007273     4.51   0.000     .0018524    .0047033
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  991.85899          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =    334.77
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      23.8
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       453
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The regression model in table 4 contains a total of 453 observations. These are nested 
in 19 countries, with a minimum of 8 observations in a country, a maximum of 28, and an 
average of 23.8. The maximum amount of observations if there were no missing data is 532 
(28*19). The first year of tax data is 1981, with three lags, we lose observations of the years 
1981, 1982 and 1983. The extension data and the data on the labor union density limits the 
period to 2011, becoming the last year in the analysis. The actual period observed becomes 
1984-2011 (28 years). With 453 observations, there are missing data on about 15% of the 
maximum amount of observations in the interval.  
The model is estimated using restricted maximum likelihood, with the residual 
covariance structure set to AR1 (autoregressive of first order) by each country, estimating an 
AR1 autocorrelation coefficient for each country. The AR coefficients are included in the 
Appendix. The AR1-coefficients vary between 0.5748035 in the UK and 0.9985759 in Japan. 
The intercepts are the average log-level of the top decile income share for countries 
with an average of zero in all the country mean variables, and a zero score on the within 
variables in the year 1980 and have not changed the tax rate the last three years. In short, the 
constant term is of little interpretative value in this model. 
6.2.1 Tax: 
Countries with a high average tax rate in the period tends to have a higher level of the 
top decile income share. For each percentage point increase in the average top statutory tax 
rate, the average change in the top decile income share is a 1.03% increase in the top decile 
income share, controlled for the other variables. 
There is a negative relationship between the within variation of the top statutory tax 
rate and the top decile income share. On average, the top decile income share is 0.67% lower 
(in the year of impact) for each percentage point increase in the tax rate, controlled for the 
other variables. One of those other variables is a cross-level interaction between the average 
tax rate in the period and the change of tax rate in a country. This is what the somewhat 
cryptically labeled “c.cm_tax#c.w_tax” represents. This interaction is positive, meaning the 
estimate for the initial impact of tax is less negative the higher the average tax rate of the 
country. In fact, if we use the maximum and minimum average tax rate from Descriptive 
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statistics we can calculate that the estimated initial impact for each percentage point tax 
increase lies between a reduction of 0.228% of the top decile income share and an increase 
of 0.033% (rounded). It is quite interesting that there is at least one country estimated to have 
a positive initial effect of a tax increase. 
The use of the phrase “initial” is because there was found to be significant lags of a tax 
change. This means that the model estimates that the “effect” of a tax change is not limited 
to the year of implementation, but also affects the top decile income share over the following 
three years. The total estimated impact of the lag is a reduction in the top decile income share 
of 0.15% for each percentage point increase in the tax rate. This is more negative than the 
most positive estimated initial impact, indicating that the estimated total effect of a tax 
change is negative for all countries in the analysis. 
The total estimated impact for each percentage point increase in the tax rate lies 
between a reduction of 0.3775% and a reduction of 0.1165% in the top decile income share 
in the sample.  
Figure 10 displays the estimated total parameter for one percentage point change in the 
tax rate for each country. Multiplying the parameter by 100 yields the estimated effect of a 
one percentage point change in the tax rate for each country. It is clear that Korea, New 
Zealand and Switzerland are the three countries with the highest estimated impact of a tax 
change. Japan, Denmark and the Netherlands are the three countries with the lowest 




Figure 10 Country specific estimated total parameter of a tax change 
H1: There is a significant negative relationship between the top statutory tax rate and 
the top decile income share 
In this model, there is a negative and significant relationship between the top decile 
income share and the change of top statutory tax rate in the model, when controlling for the 
other variables. This relationship is complicated as there are both significant lags and an 
interaction between the average level of the tax rate and the within variation of the top 
statutory tax rate. Common for all countries, when accounting for the initial impact, the 
average tax level and the lag structure, the association between the within variation of the 
top statutory tax rate and the top decile income share is negative. The model thus supports 
the hypothesis of a negative association between the top tax rates and the top decile income 
share. 
6.2.2 Collective bargaining: 
There is a negative relationship between the average labor union density rate and the 
top decile income share. The estimated top decile income share is reduced by 0.08% for each 
percentage point of the average labor union density in the period, controlled for the other 
variables. There is a negative relationship between the average extension category in the 
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period and the top decile income share. The estimated top decile income share is reduced by 
0.27% for each integer value of the average extension category in the period, controlled for 
the other variables. 
The association between the change of labor union density and the top decile income 
share is negative. The average estimated change in the top decile income share for each 
percentage point increase in the labor union density rate is a 0.69% reduction, controlled for 
the other variables. One of these other variables is the interaction between the average level 
of import as a percent of GDP in the period. Using the average country mean import as a 
percent of GDP in the period (31.59, see Descriptive statistics), we find that the average 
estimated “effect” of a percentage point increase of the labor union density is to reduce the 
top decile income share by 0.33%. The labor union density parameters in the sample lies 
between -0.005618 in Japan and 0.0003474 in Ireland.  
 
Figure 11 Country specific estimated parameter of within labor union density 
Figure 11 displays the country specific parameter of the within labor union variable. 
Ireland and the Netherlands stands out as having the least negative parameters. Ireland even 
has a positive estimated effect of labor unions.  
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The association between the change of extension category and the top decile income 
share is positive. The estimated change in the top decile income share for each increase in the 
category of the extension variable is an increase of 2.62%, controlled for the other variables. 
H2: There is a significant negative relationship between the labor union density and the 
top decile income share 
In the model, there is a negative association between the union density rate and the top 
decile income share and this association is significant, when controlling for the other variables. 
The relationship is modified by the average level of import as percent of GDP in the period. 
The range of the within parameter of labor union when accounting for the country level of 
import is negative for all countries with the exception of Ireland. The model show support for 
the hypothesis.  
H3: There is a significant negative relationship between the extension of collective 
agreements and the top decile income share 
There is a positive and significant association between the change of the extension 
classification and the top decile income share in the model, when controlling for the other 
variables. There is thus no support for the hypothesis in the model. 
H4: There is a significant positive interaction between labor union density and import as 
a percentage of GDP 
There is a significant and positive interaction between labor union density and the 
average level of import as a percentage of GDP in the model, when controlling for the other 
variables. This model show support for the hypothesis. 
6.2.3 Trade: 
Countries with a higher average import as a percent of GDP had a higher level of the top 
decile income share in the period, controlled for the other variables. On average, the top 
decile income share is increased by 1.99% for each percentage point of the average import as 
a percent of GDP in the period. There is a negative association between the average export as 
percent of GDP in the period and the top decile income share. The expected top decile income 
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share is reduced by 1.62% for each percentage point of the average export as a percent of 
GDP in the period, controlled for the other variables. 
Regarding the change of import as a percent of GDP, the relationship with the top decile 
income share is positive. The model estimates that the top decile income share is expected to 
increase by 0.05% for each percentage point increase in the import growth, controlled for the 
other variables. The relationship is also positive for the change of growth of export as a 
percent of GDP and the top decile income share. The “effect” however, is both statistically 
insignificant, and substantively negligible.  
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between import as a percent of GDP and 
the top decile income share 
In the model there is a positive relation between import as a percent of GDP and the top 
decile income share, when controlling for the other variables. The relationship however, is 
statistically insignificant. There is no support for the hypothesis in the data. 
H6: There is a significant negative relationship between exports as a percent of GDP and 
the top decile income share 
There is a positive association between import as a percent of GDP and the top decile 
income share, when controlling for the other variables. The relationship is not significant. 
There is not support for the hypothesis in the data. 
6.2.4 Control variables: 
Unemployment: 
There is a positive relationship between the average level of unemployment and the top 
decile income share. The estimated effect of unemployment on the top decile income share 
is that for each percentage point of average unemployment rate in the period, the top decile 
income share is increased by 1.5%, controlled for the other variables. The relationship 
between the change of unemployment rate and the top decile income share is negative. The 
estimated effect on the top decile income share is that it is decreased by 0.01% for each 




The association between the top decile income share and the average GDP per capita is 
positive. The estimated impact of a 1% increase of the average GDP per capita in the period, 
the top decile income share is increased by 0.24%, controlled for the other variables. The 
association between the average growth rate of GDP and the top decile income share is 
positive. The estimated effect on the top decile income share for each percentage point of 
average GDP growth in this period is an increase of 6.83%, controlled for the other variables. 
There is also a positive relationship between the change in the GDP growth rate and the top 
decile income share. The estimated impact of a one percentage point increase in the GDP 
growth rate is to increase the top decile income share by 0.15%, controlled for the other 
variables.  
Population: 
There is a positive association between the average population in the period and the 
top decile income share. The estimated effect of a 1% increase in the average population is to 
increase the top decile income share by 0.11%, controlled for the other variables. The 
association between the average population growth rate and the top decile income share is 
negative. For each percentage point of average population growth rate in the period, the top 
decile income share is reduced by 15.78% (not approximated), controlled for the other 
variables. The association between the change of population growth rate and the top decile 
income share is also negative. The estimated effect of each percentage point increase in the 
population growth rate is to decrease the top decile income share by 0.5%, controlled for the 
other variables. 
Time: 
Even after controlling for the other variables in the model there is a positive association 
between the time variable and the top decile income share. On average, the top decile income 
share is increased by 0.33% for each year, controlled for the other variables. 
7 Diagnostics and model specification 
This chapter presents a number of diagnostic plots of the model in the previous chapter. 
A qq-plot of the standardized residuals, a scatterplot of standardized residuals against fitted 
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values, a time series plot of standardized residuals by country, a histogram of the estimated 
intercepts, a box plot of residuals by country and a missing data pattern figure are included. 
Next, different estimators challenge the model. The model is tested without the outliers 
detected, a fixed effects estimator, and first-differenced models. The growth rate of import 
and export is replaced with import/export as a percent of GDP, and a trade (the sum of export 
and import) growth rate and as a percent of GDP is tested. 
7.1 Diagnostics  
The diagnostics of multilevel models are often in form of graphical plots. The most 
commonly utilized plots are the qq-plot (quantile-quantile) of the standardized residuals 
(standardized residuals against their normal score), standardized residuals against the model 
estimated values (fitted values) and histograms of intercepts (Gelman and Hill (p. 46-48), Hox 
(p. 23-28), Luke (p. 37-42), Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (p. 204-206)).  
Gelman and Hill (p. 46) argue that the most important mathematical assumption of the 
regression model is that its deterministic component is a linear function of the separate 
predictors. That is, the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory variables. 
After linearity, they rank the assumptions, in descending order of importance: the 
independence of errors, equal variance of errors and last normality of errors. Luke (p. 38) 
argues that two of the most important assumptions that can be empirically checked in a 
multilevel model are that the level-1 errors are independent and normally distributed, and 
that the random effects are normally distributed and independent (the only “random effects” 
in this model are the intercepts).  
The qq-plot is useful to test for normality of the errors, and if normality is present, the 
plot should display a straight line. Plotting residuals against fitted values is a useful way to 
check for nonlinearity and heteroscedasticity.  The assumption that the intercepts are 
normally distributed can be inspected by a qq-plot or by a histogram. To check for spatial and 
temporal independence of the residuals a time series plot of the standardized residuals and a 




Figure 12 Standardized residuals against fitted values and QQ-plot of standardized residuals 
Figure 12 to the left displays a plot of the standardized residuals versus the fitted values. 
The figure does not reveal any clear patterns, and the residuals seem to be quite equally 
distributed over the fitted values, indicating homoscedasticity. Overall, the assumption on 
linearity seems to be reasonably met. The observations marked by the country and year are 
the observations that are further than three standard deviations from zero.  
We can see that the outliers corresponds to Norway in 2005, New Zealand in 1999, 
Australia in 1988, Denmark in 2009, the Netherlands in 2000 and Sweden in 1990. In 
Descriptive statistics these observations were pointed out, and there are reasons to believe 
that these observations are at least partially generated by other mechanisms.  
Figure 12 to the right displays the QQ plot of the standardized residuals. The residuals 
follow the line quite nicely, except for the residuals at the ends. The normality assumption is 
not of the most crucial assumption, and overall the residuals seems to be distributed with a 




Figure 13 Standardized residuals over time and histogram of estimated intercepts 
Figure 13 to the left plots the standardized residuals over time. The graph reveals that 
there are still patterns to detect in the residuals, even after fitting the residual structure. This 
does not affect the point estimates of the parameters, but will affect the standard errors and 
p-values, which could be somewhat underreported. 
The histogram in figure 13 show the estimated intercepts. They appear to meet the 
normality assumption reasonably, given the sample size (19 countries), although they are 
biased toward normality. Consequently, it is hard to judge just how much the apparent of 
normality is due to bias. However, normality of the random intercepts and level-1 residuals is 
not required for consistent estimation of model parameters and standard errors, nor is it 




Figure 14 Box plot of standardized residuals by country 
Figure 14 show the standardized residuals and their distribution for each country. They 
are primarily centered around zero, although the weight is somewhat scattered. The plot is 
an indication of whether the variance of the residuals are constant across countries. There 
appears to be uniform variance, although Korea stands out as country with below average 
variance. This could be due to the smaller amount of observations in the analysis of Korea.  
Missing data 
 
Figure 15 Missing data patterns 
As mentioned in Research design, missing data could bias the coefficients. This only 
applies if data are not missing at random, meaning that missing data are missing because of 
       19    100.00            XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
                                                           
        1      5.26  100.00    1111111111111111111111111111
        1      5.26   94.74    1111111111111111111111111.1.
        1      5.26   89.47    111111111111111111111111.111
        1      5.26   84.21    111111111111111111111.111111
        1      5.26   78.95    111111111111111.111111111111
        1      5.26   73.68    111111111111..111111111111..
        1      5.26   68.42    111111.111111111111111111111
        1      5.26   63.16    1111.1111111111111111111111.
        1      5.26   57.89    .1.1.1.1.1.1111111111111111.
        1      5.26   52.63    .1...11111111111.11111111111
        1      5.26   47.37    ..1..1..1..1..1..11111111...
        1      5.26   42.11    .....11111111111111111......
        1      5.26   36.84    ......11111111111111111111..
        1      5.26   31.58    ...................11111111.
        2     10.53   26.32    11111111111111111111111111..
        3     15.79   15.79    111111111111111111111111111.
                                                           
     Freq.  Percent    Cum.    Pattern
                         8       8      21        26        27      28      28
Distribution of T_i:   min      5%     25%       50%       75%     95%     max
           (id*Year uniquely identifies each observation)
           Span(Year)  = 28 periods
           Delta(Year) = 1 unit
    Year:  1984, 1985, ..., 2011                             T =         28
      id:  1, 2, ..., 19                                     n =         19
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the value the data would have had. There are two sources of missing data in this thesis: 
missing data on the dependent variable, and missing data on the explanatory variables. 
The table in figure 15 displays the patterns of years with data on all explanatory variables 
and the dependent variable. “1” marks complete cases, while cases with missing data on one 
or more variables are marked with “.”. There are differences between the countries with 
respect to how much data they contribute. The country with the least amount of observations 
is Korea, which is not included in OECD’s historical tax tables. The figure to the right is the 
number of countries with full data in the given year, over the period with data. We can see 
that there is a slight tendency to be less data on earlier years, increasing slightly over time. 
However, in 2010 and 2011 there is a clear drop in the number of countries with full data.  
As noted in Research design, the multilevel models utilize whatever data that are 
available. As long as data on the explanatory variables exist, the model utilizes this information 
to estimate a fitted value (Hox, 2010, p. 106). 
Table 5 Missing estimated values 
 
Table 5 displays the missing occasions of the estimated values. There is a substantially 
smaller amount of missing data in this table. This show some of the strength of multilevel 
models.  
Clearly, there are more missing data earlier in the period. Combined with the general 
time-trend of increasing inequality could cause some bias. However, it is hard to tell how 
severe the problem is, as the result that would have been observed is by definition unknown. 
7.2 Alternative measures and models 
This section presents some alternative models. These models include a model estimated 
in the analogously to the model shown in Results excluding the outliers detected in the 
       19    100.00            XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
                                                           
        1      5.26  100.00    1111111.11111111111111111111
        1      5.26   94.74    ...................11111111.
        4     21.05   89.47    111111111111111111111111111.
       13     68.42   68.42    1111111111111111111111111111
                                                           
     Freq.  Percent    Cum.    Pattern
                         8       8      27        28        28      28      28
Distribution of T_i:   min      5%     25%       50%       75%     95%     max
           (id*Year uniquely identifies each observation)
           Span(Year)  = 28 periods
           Delta(Year) = 1 unit
    Year:  1984, 1985, ..., 2011                             T =         28
      id:  1, 2, ..., 19                                     n =         19
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previous section. The same model (excluding outliers) will be presented using a fixed effects 
estimator, and a first difference approach. Analogous models will be presented using trade as 
a percentage of GDP, instead of import and export as a percentage of GDP.  
Why the outliers are dropped 
An outlier is, according to Barnett and Lewis (1994, p. 7)’s definition: “(…) an observation 
(or a subset of observations) which appears to be inconsistent with the remainder of that set 
of data.”. If the outliers are generated by other mechanisms than the other observations, 
these outliers produce bias the parameter estimates of the phenomenon of interest. The 
problem with detecting outliers through fitting a statistical model to the whole data is that 
these outliers influence the choice of the model used to detect them. Through iteration, the 
identification of the error-prone observations is improved (Ecob & Der, 2003, pp. 3-4). 
The approach taken is similar to the proposed method of Ecob and Der (2003) to handle 
outliers in longitudinal analysis. Their iterative approach starts with fitting a model on the 
complete data. Then, observations considered as outliers are temporarily deleted from the 
dataset and the model refitted. The data are then examined in the context of the updated 
model. Should outliers still be present, the procedure of deleting and refitting is repeated until 
convergence is achieved (Ecob & Der, 2003, p. 6). Using this approach poses the question 
whether we are adjusting the model to the data, or the data to the model. However, there 
are reasons to believe that the observed outliers are, at least partly, caused by other 
processes. Dropping the outliers is therefore considered uncontroversial. 
Why the fixed effects model? 
As noted in Research design, the mixed model eliminates the country level confounding 
(bias). Due to missing data, some correlation still exist between some of the country mean 
variables and the within variables, as noted in Descriptive statistics, which bias the mixed 
model parameters. In addition, there could be some cluster level confounding between the 
lag of the tax variable and the estimated country intercepts. These issues do not affect the 
fixed effects model. Using the same estimation method and residual structure, we can 
investigate if the parameter estimates and standard errors are (significantly) different.  
Why the FD model?  
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When we are using a first difference (FD) model, we regress the change of the 
dependent variable on the change of the explanatory variables. As in the fixed effects model, 
the FD model solves the problem of omitted time invariant variables. The parameter estimates 
of the FD model are, however, dependent on the values of the explanatory variables to change 
for a substantial portion of countries over time. In other words, since we are regressing 
changes, there have to be enough change in the variable. If a variable show little variation, 
the estimate of the parameter becomes unreliable. 
 The advantages of using a FD model over a cross-sectional (pooled) model are greatest 
when unmeasured omitted variables bias the cross-sectional estimates, and when errors in 
the explanatory variables are strongly autocorrelated. However, the advantages of the FD 
model are weakened when the explanatory variables are highly correlated over time 
(multicollinearity) (Liker, Augustyniak, & Duncan, 1985, pp. 82-85). 
The FD model should increase the confidence in the model, as it accounts for omitted 
time invariant variables, and should mitigate the issue of autocorrelation. However, this 
estimation comes at a cost. Differentiating the series filtrates away some of the variance in 
the data, resulting in larger standard errors and increases the risk of committing type two 
errors (Skog, 2004, p. 341). We also lose the observation at the start of the series, that is, one 
more than with the mixed models, in addition to one observation per country for each gap in 
the data. In addition, as in the fixed effects models, we cannot investigate what affects the 
level differences across countries while using the FD model. 
As noted in Trends, stationarity and autocorrelation the trend of the variables might 
pose problems regarding the p-values of the regression models. In Descriptive statistics it was 
noted that the tax, labor union, import and export variables showed noticeable trends in this 
period. The associations and significance levels observed might be a construct of similar trends 
with the top decile income share, rather than any causal relationship. 
The problems concerning trends also applies to the first difference model if there are 
trends in the change of the variables. Even though the top decile income share show a 
persistent trend over time, this might not be true for the change of the top decile income 
share over time. A time series plot of the change of all the variables are included in the 
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Appendix. There does not appear to be any problems regarding trends in the difference of any 
of the variables. 
7.2.1 Import and export models 
Table 6 Regressions: import and export 
 
The first model, “Mixed (all)”, is the same model as in Results. The second model, “Mixed 
(no outliers)”, is the same model without the noted outliers. The third model, “Fixed (ML)”, is 
the same model with the same residual structure (unique autoregressive parameters of first 
order for all countries) including country dummies, estimated using the mixed command in 
Stata with the “noconstant” option. This model is estimated using maximum likelihood, due 
to non-convergence using restricted maximum likelihood (as is used estimating the other 
models). The fourth model, “First-difference (mixed)”, is a first differentiated model using the 
67 
 
data with no outliers, the same relationships as the other models, and the same residual 
structure. The fifth model, “First-difference (fixed)” is also a first differentiated model on the 
data without outliers, with the same residual structure. However, it is a fixed effects estimator, 
estimated with country dummies using the mixed command in Stata, with the “noconstant” 
option.  
The numbers in parentheses are the p-values of the coefficients with two stars indicating 
significance at the 5% level and a single star indicates a significance at the 10% level. The full 
Stata output of the models are listed in the Appendix, along with residual plots of the mixed 
model discarding outliers and the first-difference (fixed) model.  
Results 
The third lag of the tax lag is not significant in any of the models besides the mixed model 
with all observations. An LR-test on the mixed model without outliers reveals that the lag is 
insignificant. Only the second lag of the tax variable is significant at the 10% level in the FD 
models. As noted, the FD models are sensitive to multicollinearity, and the lags of the tax 
variable are highly correlated with each other. This combined with fewer observations and 
lower variation could be the cause behind the insignificant lags in the FD models. The 
interaction between the average level of taxation and within tax variable is significant in all 
models. 
The labor union variable is significant at the 5% level in all models, except the fixed FD 
model, where it is significant at the 10% level. The interaction between the within labor union 
density and the country mean import as a percent of GDP is significant in all models except 
for the fixed FD model. The coefficient is similar to the estimates of the other models.  
The within extension variable is positive and significant in all the models. The coefficient 
estimates are notably lower in the FD models. This could be due to the difficulties the FD 
models have with variables rarely changing, resulting in unstable parameter estimates. 




One thing to note is that due to collinearity there cannot be included a time variable in 
the FD models. However, the constant term is the estimated change holding the other 
variables constant, in other words, change not accounted for. The intercepts in FD models are 
therefore closely related to the time variable in the other models10.  
The mixed model without outliers, the first series for UK and observations after the year 
2000 for the Netherlands can be found in the Appendix. The results are not fundamentally 
different from the mixed model without outliers.  
7.2.2 Trade models 
The table below displays the same estimators as the table above, but instead of using 
import and export as a percent of GDP as two separate variables, trade (the sum of the two) 
is used. 
                                                     
10 The time variable is the linear time trend not accounted for by other variables in the model. 
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Table 7 Regressions: trade 
 
First of all, the models are similar to the other models concerning the explanatory 
variables. We can see that the within trade variable is positive in all the models, which we 
would expect given that both import and export were positive in the earlier models. The 
variable is significant in all the models, except for the mixed model with al observations. 
Interesting to note is that the interaction between the country mean trade variable and 
the within labor union density is positive, as earlier when the country mean import variable 
was used. As in previous models, the interaction is significant in all models except for the FD 




This chapter reviews the findings of this thesis, answer the research question and places 
the results in the context of earlier research. First, the models and robustness are discussed. 
Second, a remainder of the sample and population is given, before a clarification about what 
support for hypotheses actually means. The rest of this chapter goes through the relationships 
of interest one by one. 
Method 
The main model used is a random effects model with between and within variables, 
separating level effects from changes over time. Because of the separation of the effects, the 
model is very close to a fixed effects model. The advantage of this approach, as opposed to a 
regular fixed effects model, is that the random effects model yields estimates of the level 
effects of the variables. These are consumed in the regular fixed effects model by the dummy 
variables. Due to the sample size and the likely omitted country level variables there are limits 
to what we can read out of the country level coefficients, but they can give valuable 
indications discarded in the fixed effects model. In addition, this approach allows for 
estimating other country level variables of interest, as well as incorporating random 
coefficients. These opportunities, however,  can only be exploited with a sufficient sample, 
which is rarely the case in cross-national studies (Möhring, 2012). 
Robustness of the findings were tested by omitting outliers, using a fixed-effects model, 
a first-difference mixed model, and a first-differenced fixed model. The models largely agree, 
with a few exceptions discussed below. The strong agreement between the models gives 
confidence in the results. In addition, this agreement reflects the model performance, despite 
considerable challenges, such as clear trends in the dependent variable and some of the 
explanatory variables. 
Diagnostics were performed, and the results was encouraging, as no severe violations 
seems to have been made. There is always the issue of missing data, and whether these are 
missing at random. This is of course unknown. There were perhaps slight time trends in the 
missing data, possibly biasing the estimates, as we know that the trend in the top decile share 
have seen a general increase in the period. 
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The time trends in the tax, labor union, import, export, trade and the income share 
variables causes some problems concerning hypothesis tests and potential spurious findings. 
In the mixed and fixed models, this was handled using a residual structure (unique AR1 
parameters). However, specifying a residual structure is no guarantee, and the analysis was 
supplemented with first differenced models. This increases the confidence in the results, as 
the trend issue seems to be overcome with the first differencing. The same residual structure 
was also specified in the FD models to tackle potential autocorrelation left after first 
differencing the variables. 
Sample and generalizations 
The sample here is the countries and the years where the countries have complete data. 
The population is the full period for the countries. The statistical tests is thus a test if the 
findings can be generalized to the whole period, for all the countries. 
Since the selection of the sample of observations is correlated with the dependent 
variable (we know that the trend has generally been an increase in the top decile income share 
in the period under investigation), these findings need not be valid for other periods. The 
sample does not cover the full range of variation on the top decile income share. The “cycles” 
are extremely slow, and at present, there does not exist good, comparative data for the 
variables of interest to cover a full cycle on the top decile income share. This should be partly 
overcome by the use of longitudinal analysis, as we also get the cross sectional variation. 
Nonetheless, when the selection rule is correlated with the dependent variable, the numerical 
estimates of causal effects will be closer to zero than they really are (King et al., 1994, p. 130).  
Causality and the hypotheses 
The hypotheses implies causality, and indeed, this can be viewed as the overarching goal 
(to use Collier et al. (2004)’s terminology). When the hypotheses are evaluated, they are 
evaluated from a falsifying principle. The support for a hypothesis is not the same as claiming 
causality. It is simply a statement that in the data and with the analytical methods used; there 
is sufficient support for the hypothesis, relative to the null-hypothesis (of no relationship). 




This thesis aims at answering the question: 
“Can collective bargaining, tax policy and trade openness explain the increase in the top 
deciles' gross income share in OECD countries in the period 1981-2011?” 
Each part of the research question is discussed below, before a final assessment of each 
component is made. 
8.1 Tax 
In Theoretical and conceptual framework the channels through which taxation can alter 
the income distribution were discussed. These were connected to the income and substitution 
effects, and the bargaining position for executives. These are theories operating at the 
individual level, and conclusions about the specific effects requires individual-level data with 
information about the hours worked and indicators of bargaining power. This thesis cannot 
conclude on these specific effects and their relative contribution. What we can conclude is 
how the aggregated effect of these and other effects concerning taxation and behavioral 
change relates to the top decile income share.  
There were three significant negative lags in the model using all observations. However, 
the third lag was not significant in any of the other models. There is a possibility that the 
significance of the third lag is a construct of one or more of the observations dropped from 
the other models. Two lags are supported in the mixed and fixed models without outliers. The 
second lag was also significant at the 10% level in the FD models, although neither the third 
nor the first was significant. 
The insignificance of the lags in the FD models could be due to some of the weaknesses 
with FD models in general. The models are less efficient when multicollinearity is present. The 
approach also filtrates variance and induce more missing data, lowering the statistical power 
of the model. 
There could also be that the significant lags are a construct of the period under 
investigation. As the FD models lose more observations at the beginning of the period, there 
is necessarily more data lost at the start of the period. There is the possibility that the lags are 
only applicable to the earlier part of the period. However, using the mixed approach on the 
same observations as the FD models reveals that the two first lags are still significant. This 
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poses the question: are there any theoretical reasons to expect a lag structure of the tax rate 
on the income distribution? 
 Saez et al. (2012) discuss several potential individual behavior responses to tax 
changes, some of them related to timing. If, for example, individuals anticipate a tax increase, 
they have incentives to accelerate taxable income realizations before the tax change takes 
place. As a result, reported taxable income just after reform will be lower than otherwise. In 
addition, if current income tax rates increase while long-term future expected income tax 
rates do not, individuals might decide to defer some of their incomes. Adjusting to changes in 
taxation could also take time, as individuals might decide to change career or educational 
choices or businesses might change their long-term investment decisions (Saez et al., 2012, 
pp. 12-13). 
There is a significant and positive interaction between the initial impact of the tax 
variable and the country mean tax rate in the period in all the models, suggesting that the 
effect of a tax change relates to the average tax level in the country. The effects of a tax change 
becomes less negative the higher the average tax level. 
 Piketty (2014, p. 520) writes that the tax is more than just a tax. Taxation is also a way 
of defining norms. In this perspective, the average tax level could reflect confounding social 
norms about equality and redistribution. It could mean greater acceptance for taxation, and 
a lower degree and social acceptance of tax avoidance and evasion.  
If the social norms reduces tax avoidance and/or evasion, while tax changes alters the 
incentive for tax avoidance/evasion, this could explain the observed interaction. Tax 
avoidance and evasion should decrease the top decile income share, as a proportion of the 





Figure 16 Social norms, tax evasion and the income distribution 
Thus, the observed change in the income distribution should be lower in the case where 
social norms hinder tax evasion. This is conditional on the mitigating effect of social norms 
being stronger than the economic incentives associated with the higher tax rate. This relation 
is illustrated in figure 16. 
The income effect could also be more pronounced in the countries with a higher average 
tax rate in this period. In this case, the contracting effect of the substitution effect is in part 
offset by the widening effect of the income effect11. 
A third explanation relates to the bargaining power of top executives. The bargaining 
power, and incentives for chasing wage increases, of top executives are thought to decrease 
with the tax level. If the combined effect of the bargaining power and incentives is to 
moderate the responses of top executives to tax changes, we should experience less 
movement in the income distribution the higher the initial tax level. 
Final assessment 
The results show a strong support for the hypothesis that decreasing tax rates leads to 
an increase in the top decile income share. There appears to be a lagging effect, and the total 
effect appears to be moderated by the average tax rate in the country over the period.  
The data supports that the decreasing trend in the top statutory tax rates could have 
caused the top decile income share to increase in the period. 
                                                     
11 See Theoretical and conceptual framework for a reminder on the effects 










The within import as a percent of GDP was not significant in any of the models. The 
coefficient was, as expected, positive in all models. There is a chance that the standard errors 
of the import and export variables are inflated by collinearity. LR-tests on whether models 
without the variables was significantly worse than when they were included, was not 
significant. This applied to models where they were left out one at a time, and when both 
were excluded simultaneously. 
The level of import as a percent of GDP was positively associated with the top decile 
income share. This indicates that the countries that had a higher level of import as a percent 
of GDP in this period also tended to have a higher level of the top decile income share, 
controlled for the other variables. The variable was significant, but the coefficients and 
significance of the country level variables should be interpreted with caution. One obvious 
critique is that country mean variables varies with the period under investigation. 
Export: 
The within export as a percent of GDP variable was not significant in any of the models. 
The coefficient was positive, contrary to the theoretical expectations. However, the level of 
export as a percent of GDP was negatively associated with the top decile income share. The 
variable was significant in the model with the outliers dropped, but not in the model with all 
observations included. The same issues related to the collinearity with import also applies to 
the export variable. 
Trade: 
The within trade as a percent of GDP variable was positive in all models. This is not 
surprising since we know that the two variables it is comprised of both had a positive 
coefficient separately. The variable was significant at the 5% level in all models, except for the 
model including all observations. 
The level of trade is positive, but insignificant, in both the mixed models. Thus, there is 
no significant association with the level of trade and the level of the top decile income share. 
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There is support for the hypothesis that trade openness, as measured as the sum of 
import and export as a percent of GDP, increases the top decile income share, contrasting the 
findings of Reuveny and Li (2003). They investigated the income inequality by the use of the 
Gini-coefficient, and found a significant negative association between trade openness and the 
Gini-coefficient in OECD countries. Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström (2009) found a positive 
and insignificant association between the change of trade openness and the bottom 90% 
income share. Since the bottom 90% income share is the inverse of the top decile, this 
translates to a negative association for the top decile income share.  
Final assessment  
There is support for the hypothesis that the increase in trade openness (as measured as 
the sum of import and export as a percent of GDP) could have caused the top decile income 
share to increase in this period. However, there is no support for separate effects of import 
and export as a percent of GDP. 
8.3 Collective bargaining 
There was a significant negative association between the union density rate and the top 
decile income share in all models. The variable was significant at the 5% level in all models 
with the exceptions of the FD fixed models, where it was significant at the 10% level.  
The cross-level interaction between the change of labor union density and the country 
mean import variable (trade in the model using trade) was significant in all models, with the 
exception of the FD fixed models.  
The theoretical reason for testing this interaction is that international trade is thought 
to decrease the bargaining position for unions. Some of the arguments are based on 
competitiveness: in order to be able to compete with global markets, firms must decrease 
their expenses, for example by cutting wages. The unions and workers then face the choice: 
decrease wages and keep employment, or keep wages and accept job cuts. 
If international trade decreases the bargaining power of unions, then we would expect 
countries with a greater exposure to international markets to be more affected than countries 
with less exposed economies. The reason for using the country mean import as a percent of 
77 
 
GDP in the interaction, instead of the yearly change, is that there could be significant inertia 
between the openness and the ultimate effect on the bargaining power. The effect of 
international trade on the bargaining power presumably relates to the expectations of both 
unions and corporations on future exposure to international markets. If import grows 
substantially in a given year, and the long term expectations of the unions and corporations 
remains unchanged, the bargaining power would probably only be marginally changed. If, 
however, the economy should be highly exposed over a substantial period, the expectations 
would probably change as well. There is also the issue that a collective agreement usually 
covers more than a year. Even if the bargaining power was de facto changed in the same year, 
the effects on the income distribution should only take effect when new agreements are 
bargained for.  
The reduction of the union “effect” on the income distribution is in line with findings of 
Abraham, Konings, and Vanormelingen (2009). Investigating firms in Belgium, they find that 
sectors with high import penetration rates tends to have lower union bargaining power. The 
sectors of the firms can be viewed as countries in this thesis, and the sector import 
penetration as the country’s import as a percent of GDP. They explicitly seek to measure the 
bargaining power of unions, and find that it is reduced by import penetration. This lends 
support to the hypothesis that the observed lower expectation in the top decile income share, 
as a result of a change in the union density rates given the (mean) import as a percent of GDP, 
is related to the bargaining power of the unions. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the extension variables was positive in all the models, and the 
change of extension was significant in all the models at the 5% level, except for in the FD fixed 
models where it was significant at the 10% level. 
The expectation was that with more inclusive extension mechanisms, the less inequality 
would be observed. As indicated earlier, this measure is rather crude. It is hard to believe that 
extensions of union agreements should increase the top decile income share. The positive 
association is likely to be confounded by other factors. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) also found 
a positive association between broad extensions and inequality. They think the positive 
association might be due to higher unemployment. However, in this study, the unemployment 
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is included as a control variable. Therefore, a higher unemployment rate cannot be the sole 
explanation for the positive relationship. 
Final assessment 
There is support for the hypothesis that the decreasing trend in labor union density rates 
could have caused the top decile income share to increase in the period. The estimated effects 
of union density is moderated by the trade openness of a country, with a higher degree of 
openness reducing the estimated effects of unions. 
The data does not support the hypothesis that the extensions and enlargements of 
collective agreements have decreased the top decile income share.  
8.4 Controls 
GDP 
Besides the main findings, it was interesting that the GDP growth variable was significant 
and positive in all models, indicating that economic growth is more beneficial for the top decile 
group than for the bottom 90%. This is in line with Roine, Vlachos, and Walderström (2009)’s 
findings. They find that this is likely a cause of top incomes being more closely related to actual 
performance than incomes on average. 
The causal direction between inequality and growth is not clear-cut. While growth might 
affect the inequality, for example through high incomes being linked to the economy 
(bonuses, dividends etc.), the case can be made that the inequality affects growth. Stiglitz 
(2012, pp. 104-147) discusses several channels through which inequality can hinder growth. 
One channel is through the demand and spending of the middle class. As they generally spend 
a larger proportion of their incomes, a greater demand would have been produced by shifting 
income in their direction. Thus, demand is less than it could have been, and the economy is 
producing less than it could have done. 
The findings goes against Kuznets (1955) hypothesis. However, it is not completely fair 
to draw any conclusions from the models here, as technological change, which is central to 




The population growth variable was significant in most of the models, and negative in 
all. This lends support to the hypothesis that a growing population contracts the income 
distribution.  
Unemployment 
The change in unemployment rate was not significant in any models, and the sign was 
not conclusive. However, the level of unemployment was positive and significant at the 10% 
level in the models that can estimate level effects. This indicates that countries with a higher 
unemployment rate in this period also have a higher level of income inequality. Perhaps there 
is a long lag before the unemployment rate starts to affect the income distribution that was 
not found with the three lags included here. The bottom line, though, is that there is no 
support for the hypothesis that a change of unemployment is increasing the top decile income 
share.   
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9 Concluding remarks 
This thesis set out to empirically analyze the relationship between the top decile income 
share and top tax rates, collective bargaining and trade openness. While these relationships 
have been studied before, the unique contribution of this thesis lies in the statistical approach 
utilized, and the additional data exploration it offers. 
There were found significant relationships between most of the variables of primary 
interest. The only variables without any significant relationship over time was import and 
export penetration. Treated together, however, the trade variable was significant and positive 
over time. This suggests that increased international trade have benefitted high-income 
groups more than proportionally. This thesis cannot give the answers to which mechanisms 
this effect works through. However, the theoretical framework suggests that the lower 
demand for domestic jobs associated with a greater trade penetration might reduce wages of 
already low-wage workers. 
Trade penetration was found to affect the income distribution through an additional 
channel: through an interaction with union density rates. The level of trade penetration (and 
import penetration) appears to mitigate the negative (and significant) effect of unions. 
Countries with a higher penetration appears to have a lower negative effect of unions. This 
supports the argument that international trade lowers the bargaining power of unions. 
The association between top tax rates and the income distribution is rather complex. 
First, tax rates appears to have a negative impact in the year of implementation. Second, the 
effect seems to last for two to three years after the implementation. Third, the initial impact 
appears to be mitigated by the average tax level in the period under investigation, with 
countries having higher average tax rates experiencing a less negative initial impact. Three 
potential explanations are offered. First, the tax level might be confounded by social norms, 
such as a lower social tolerance for tax avoidance and evasion. If norms reduce incentives for 
these activities, the effect of tax changes on the (reported) income distribution should be less 
pronounced. Second, the income effect might be stronger in these countries, counteracting 
the contracting effects of the substitution effect. Third, higher tax rates could moderate 
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responses of top executive, through lower bargaining power and incentives to chase wage 
increases. 
9.1 Further research 
This thesis found interesting associations, but offer few answers to the mechanisms at 
work. The theoretical framework offer potential explanations and can function as a guide; 
however, further research is needed to put these explanations to test. 
There are some findings worthy of further inquiry. I will encourage more research 
regarding the relatively complex tax association, and especially regarding the interaction 
between the average tax level and the effect of tax changes. Three potential explanations are 
offered, and it is of interest to find out if they have any explanatory power. 
The interaction between labor unions and trade openness is little investigated in the 
context of income distribution, and further inquiry is needed to increase the confidence of the 
finding. 
The significant positive association between the change and level of extensions and the 
top decile income share is surprising. Jaumotte and Buitron (2015) found a qualitative similar 
result, and hypothesized that this could be due to a trade off with a higher unemployment. 
This cannot be the whole story, as this thesis control for both the level and change of 
unemployment. This is worthy of further investigation. 
This thesis cover a relatively short time span relative to distributional cycles, and a 
small sample of countries. As larger quantities of good quality data becomes available, the 
associations found here ought to be tested in a longer time span and in a larger sample of 
countries. In addition, many stones are left unturned in this thesis. Potential factors affecting 
the income distribution, such as minimum wages, financial developments and technological 
change are not addressed. Since leaving out relevant explanatory variables increases the 
chance of confounding and spurious findings, I would like to encourage investigation of the 
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Two-way error components model 
 
The two-way error-components model was used to estimate the cross-sectional correlation. 









Top decile income share: 
LR test vs. linear model: chi2(2) = 307.05                Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
               var(Residual)     .0022369   .0001442      .0019713    .0025382
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     2.45e-23   2.22e-22      4.62e-31    1.30e-15
occ: Identity                 
                                                                              
                   var(R.CN)     .0025398   .0008526      .0013153    .0049041
_all: Identity                
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     2.267827    1.46632     1.55   0.122    -.6061079    5.141762
       w_ext     .0637066   .0074723     8.53   0.000     .0490612     .078352
      cm_ext    -.0430693   .0178166    -2.42   0.016    -.0779892   -.0081495
     w_labor    -.0071324   .0007016   -10.17   0.000    -.0085076   -.0057572
    cm_labor    -.0040134   .0015178    -2.64   0.008    -.0069883   -.0010385
     w_popgr    -.0135545   .0058763    -2.31   0.021    -.0250718   -.0020372
    cm_popgr    -.1183556   .1032354    -1.15   0.252    -.3206933     .083982
   cm_logpop     .0054271   .0317501     0.17   0.864    -.0568019    .0676561
     w_expgr     .0003944   .0004173     0.94   0.345    -.0004236    .0012123
    cm_expgr      -.03187   .0556085    -0.57   0.567    -.1408607    .0771207
      cm_exp    -.0130606    .009938    -1.31   0.189    -.0325388    .0064176
     w_impgr    -.0008767   .0004113    -2.13   0.033    -.0016829   -.0000706
    cm_impgr     .0096223   .0995443     0.10   0.923    -.1854809    .2047256
      cm_imp     .0145064   .0100955     1.44   0.151    -.0052803    .0342932
      w_unem     .0044664   .0009987     4.47   0.000      .002509    .0064238
     cm_unem     .0141539   .0066765     2.12   0.034     .0010682    .0272395
     w_GDPgr     .0043798   .0011403     3.84   0.000     .0021449    .0066147
    cm_GDPgr       .07894    .070549     1.12   0.263    -.0593336    .2172136
   cm_logGDP     .1382998   .1738312     0.80   0.426    -.2024031    .4790026
       w_tax    -.0026907   .0003715    -7.24   0.000    -.0034188   -.0019626
      cm_tax    -.0038202   .0036353    -1.05   0.293    -.0109452    .0033049
         occ     .0027034   .0004637     5.83   0.000     .0017946    .0036123
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  783.92054                     Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(21)     =    1149.58
                                                             
            occ           31          6       16.1         19
           _all            1        500      500.0        500
                                                             
 Group Variable       Groups    Minimum    Average    Maximum
                      No. of       Observations per Group
                                                             







Top statutory tax rates: 
Countries with only the central level taxation: 
Australia (with surtaxes), France (with surtaxes), Germany, Ireland, Japan, Korea (problems), 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, United Kingdom. 
Countries with a sub-central level: 
Canada (see explanation), Denmark, Finland (see explanation), Italy (see explanation), 






Canada have a basic provincial tax, and some of these have an additional surtax, calculated 
as a percentage of the provincial basic tax. For the representative province, Ontario, this is 
20-56 % of the basic tax of 11,16 for the year 2000. That gives total tax of: 29 (central tax) + 
1,56*11,16. For the time period 1981-1999 this surtax is provided in the dataset as surtax in 
a percent. For 1981 then, the top tax is calculated as central tax + sub-central representative 
tax (Ontario) + surtax for the representative province. This is the same as for the period 
2000-2013, but we operate with an additive surtax instead of the percentage of the 
provincial tax. 
Finland: 
The only information about the sub-central taxation for Finland is the maximum sub-central 
rate for the period 1981-1999. Top statutory: central + sub-central rate. 
Italy: 
Central government tax rates + representative regional taxes (Lazio)(From 1998-) + 
representative local taxes (Rome)(From 2002-) 
Norway: 
Central government tax rate + surtax + sub-central tax rate 
Portugal: 
The top statutory tax rate that is stated in table 1.8 seems to contain the Social Security 
Contribution (SSC). In the data calculated and reported here the top tax rate is the same as 
the top tax rate at central level, i.e. without SSC. 
Switzerland: 
Central government tax rate + sub-central.  
United States: 
The calculated data is the top central tax + local and state level taxes. That is: central tax rate 






These figures show the distributions of the standardized residuals of an empty mixed-model.   
Inspecting the distribution graphical, it is clear that the top decile income share is not 
perfectly normally distributed. The figures below display a histogram of the raw variable (top 
decile income share) at the left and the log-transformed variable at the right. 
 
The figure displays the two distributions, with a normal curve overlaid. As we can see, the 
raw income share variable seems to be slightly skewed to the right. The log transformation 
appears to make the distribution more normal. Below are the results of the skewness test 
performed on both distributions. 
Skewness-test of income share variables: 
      share10      511      0.0004         0.8561        11.49         0.0032
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       




The test is a test of normality, and a significant test indicates that the distribution is 
significantly different from normal. The test rejects that the raw variable is not skewed, and 
that it is normally distributed (joint test), while it fails to reject normality of the log 
transformed variable. 
Results 
       log10      511      0.5379         0.7872         0.46         0.7962
                                                                             
    Variable      Obs   Pr(Skewness)   Pr(Kurtosis)  adj chi2(2)    Prob>chi2
                                                                 joint       






LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =  1084.09   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0124635   .0249238      .0002474    .6277967
       United States:    rho     .9921865   .0156812      .6618474    .9998488
                              
                      var(e)     .0009234   .0004049       .000391     .002181
      United Kingdom:    rho     .5748035   .1820993      .1210545     .829859
                              
                      var(e)      .001161   .0024768      .0000177    .0759755
         Switzerland:    rho     .9413746   .1255141     -.3897123    .9991994
                              
                      var(e)     .0160093   .0343917      .0002376    1.078815
              Sweden:    rho     .9924871   .0162685       .578492    .9998935
                              
                      var(e)     .0205688   .0428922      .0003453    1.225235
               Spain:    rho     .9961668   .0079682      .7956392    .9999352
                              
                      var(e)     .0065575   .0137284      .0001083    .3969794
            Portugal:    rho     .9556472   .0942582     -.2324078    .9993595
                              
                      var(e)     .0082106   .0040165      .0031476    .0214176
              Norway:    rho     .6624302   .1610838      .2303323    .8763288
                              
                      var(e)     .0065426   .0051039      .0014182    .0301835
         New Zealand:    rho     .7845174   .1705145      .1857179     .958419
                              
                      var(e)     .0023446   .0048672      .0000401    .1371253
         Netherlands:    rho     .9354272   .1358232     -.4052662    .9990583
                              
                      var(e)     .0022199   .0023175      .0002869    .0171763
               Korea:    rho     .5927801   .4198645     -.5275888    .9603723
                              
                      var(e)     .0782801   .1523749      .0017249    3.552583
               Japan:    rho     .9985759   .0027928      .9354246    .9999696
                              
                      var(e)     .0074797   .0238436      .0000145    3.866449
               Italy:    rho     .9943326   .0180022     -.1877768     .999989
                              
                      var(e)     .0019033   .0016313      .0003548     .010211
             Ireland:    rho     .8157869   .1572888      .2188539    .9683887
                              
                      var(e)     .0011738    .000817         .0003    .0045927
             Germany:    rho     .6420566   .2907972     -.2050816    .9392166
                              
                      var(e)     .0038533   .0080306      .0000648     .228984
              France:    rho     .9918005   .0169934      .6087867    .9998606
                              
                      var(e)     .0014825   .0020549       .000098    .0224333
             Finland:    rho     .7599085   .3330336     -.4996133    .9876564
                              
                      var(e)     .0012901   .0032745      8.91e-06    .1867139
             Denmark:    rho     .9367517   .1615687     -.7035428    .9996289
                              
                      var(e)       .02113   .0385289      .0005927    .7533523
              Canada:    rho     .9972262   .0050999      .9024674    .9999248
                              
                      var(e)     .0017171    .001019      .0005366    .0054944
           Australia:    rho     .6138273   .2287866     -.0044756    .8925962
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     .0020919   .0032497      .0000996    .0439396
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .7635445    2.08583     0.37   0.714    -3.324607    4.851696
              
   c.w_labor     .0001137   .0000545     2.09   0.037     6.84e-06    .0002205
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax     .0001107   .0000444     2.49   0.013     .0000237    .0001977
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0004324   .0002044    -2.12   0.034     -.000833   -.0000319
         L2.    -.0004824   .0002257    -2.14   0.033    -.0009247   -.0000402
         L1.    -.0005781   .0002313    -2.50   0.012    -.0010314   -.0001248
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0261798   .0090022     2.91   0.004     .0085359    .0438238
      cm_ext    -.0026757   .0239269    -0.11   0.911    -.0495715    .0442201
     w_labor    -.0069233     .00184    -3.76   0.000    -.0105296    -.003317
    cm_labor    -.0008357   .0029683    -0.28   0.778    -.0066534    .0049819
     w_popgr    -.0050979   .0030404    -1.68   0.094    -.0110569    .0008611
    cm_popgr    -.1717673   .1442111    -1.19   0.234    -.4544158    .1108811
   cm_logpop     .0326228   .0526405     0.62   0.535    -.0705506    .1357962
       w_exp     9.24e-06   .0007547     0.01   0.990      -.00147    .0014885
      cm_exp    -.0162247   .0103775    -1.56   0.118    -.0365644    .0041149
       w_imp     .0005072   .0008201     0.62   0.536    -.0011001    .0021145
      cm_imp     .0199159   .0109835     1.81   0.070    -.0016114    .0414432
      w_unem    -.0001219   .0008243    -0.15   0.882    -.0017375    .0014937
     cm_unem     .0150219   .0084189     1.78   0.074    -.0014789    .0315227
     w_GDPgr     .0015166   .0003943     3.85   0.000     .0007437    .0022895
    cm_GDPgr     .0683415   .0525878     1.30   0.194    -.0347288    .1714117
   cm_logGDP     .2403548   .2512164     0.96   0.339    -.2520203    .7327299
       w_tax    -.0067094   .0024342    -2.76   0.006    -.0114803   -.0019385
      cm_tax    -.0103077   .0042173    -2.44   0.015    -.0185734    -.002042
         occ     .0032779   .0007273     4.51   0.000     .0018524    .0047033
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  991.85899          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =    334.77
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      23.8
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       453
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The plots above show the evolution of the change of the variables. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.8663
                          =        7.64
                 chi2(13) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mixed
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mixed
                                                                              
   c.w_labor      .0000775      .000078       -4.25e-07        3.74e-07
    c.cm_imp# 
     c.w_tax      .0001413     .0001407        6.87e-07        4.61e-07
    c.cm_tax# 
         L3.     -.0023989    -.0023893       -9.65e-06        6.18e-06
         L2.     -.0008548    -.0008579        3.11e-06        4.36e-06
         L1.     -.0003892    -.0003926        3.38e-06        3.11e-06
       w_tax  
       w_ext       .065441     .0653137        .0001273        .0001825
     w_labor     -.0088618    -.0088595       -2.34e-06        .0000244
     w_popgr     -.0105364    -.0104681       -.0000683        .0000677
       w_exp     -.0003468    -.0003179       -.0000289        .0000162
       w_imp      .0017212     .0016926        .0000287        .0000157
      w_unem      .0050482     .0050549       -6.61e-06        .0000137
     w_GDPgr      .0035828     .0035774        5.47e-06         .000012
       w_tax     -.0073187    -.0072922       -.0000265        .0000212
         occ      .0018892       .00189       -7.99e-07        .0000143
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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The tables below are: to the left, “Mixed (no outliers)” to the right “Fixed (ML)
 LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =  1130.25   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0062796   .0096452      .0003094    .1274528
       United States:    rho     .9841209   .0246906      .7054049    .9992587
                              
                      var(e)     .0008998    .000395      .0003806    .0021272
      United Kingdom:    rho     .5873331   .1774116      .1417847    .8349989
                              
                      var(e)     .0009565   .0014076      .0000535    .0171131
         Switzerland:    rho     .9213511   .1175547      .0730497    .9961281
                              
                      var(e)     .0094886   .0178146      .0002394    .3761056
              Sweden:    rho     .9916331   .0158452      .7026607    .9997979
                              
                      var(e)     .0140912   .0273607      .0003135    .6334559
               Spain:    rho     .9939359   .0117873      .7561096    .9998668
                              
                      var(e)     .0041093    .006013      .0002335    .0723258
            Portugal:    rho     .9311835   .1032019      .1441929    .9966104
                              
                      var(e)     .0050319   .0027146       .001748    .0144853
              Norway:    rho     .7707192   .1222942      .4067496    .9235262
                              
                      var(e)     .1192029   .1751827      .0066888    2.124359
         New Zealand:    rho     .9932816   .0100363      .8803818    .9996429
                              
                      var(e)     .0017407   .0025765      .0000957    .0316701
         Netherlands:    rho     .9393342   .0916591      .2025607     .997053
                              
                      var(e)     .0020203   .0019379      .0003083    .0132402
               Korea:    rho     .5562347   .4192479     -.5098159    .9485595
                              
                      var(e)     .1217631   .1841506      .0062833     2.35964
               Japan:    rho     .9990837   .0014092      .9814722    .9999551
                              
                      var(e)     .0079997   .0158689      .0001639    .3904737
               Italy:    rho     .9947948   .0103832      .7675646    .9998964
                              
                      var(e)     .0019856   .0016955      .0003724    .0105861
             Ireland:    rho     .8200311   .1520425      .2422205    .9684487
                              
                      var(e)     .0010444   .0006232      .0003243    .0033635
             Germany:    rho     .5966461   .2848793     -.1771771    .9145925
                              
                      var(e)     .0032754   .0069154      .0000523    .2053093
              France:    rho     .9899709   .0211357      .5150122    .9998413
                              
                      var(e)     .0012762   .0009907      .0002787    .0058437
             Finland:    rho     .7226957   .2152232      .0302329    .9464202
                              
                      var(e)     .0011921   .0020571      .0000405    .0350857
             Denmark:    rho     .9647165   .0612967      .2699261    .9988786
                              
                      var(e)     .0875569   .1271445      .0050843    1.507825
              Canada:    rho     .9993907   .0009022      .9889492    .9999666
                              
                      var(e)     .0016236   .0012472      .0003603     .007317
           Australia:    rho     .7003567   .2318854     -.0240199    .9425058
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     5.69e-22          .             .           .
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons      -6.9855   2.671456    -2.61   0.009    -12.22146   -1.749543
              
   c.w_labor     .0001335   .0000536     2.49   0.013     .0000285    .0002385
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax     .0001324   .0000432     3.07   0.002     .0000478    .0002171
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0001255   .0002176    -0.58   0.564    -.0005521    .0003011
         L2.    -.0006749   .0002138    -3.16   0.002    -.0010939   -.0002559
         L1.    -.0005375   .0002134    -2.52   0.012    -.0009558   -.0001192
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0200617    .008572     2.34   0.019     .0032608    .0368625
      cm_ext     .0463821   .0158563     2.93   0.003     .0153042    .0774599
     w_labor    -.0074177   .0018335    -4.05   0.000    -.0110113    -.003824
    cm_labor    -.0002856   .0021045    -0.14   0.892    -.0044104    .0038392
     w_popgr     -.004673   .0029372    -1.59   0.112    -.0104299    .0010838
    cm_popgr    -.5064368   .1343624    -3.77   0.000    -.7697823   -.2430914
   cm_logpop      .029853   .0358137     0.83   0.405    -.0403406    .1000466
       w_exp     .0001592    .000684     0.23   0.816    -.0011813    .0014998
      cm_exp     -.036903   .0085891    -4.30   0.000    -.0537373   -.0200687
       w_imp     .0005743    .000746     0.77   0.441    -.0008879    .0020364
      cm_imp     .0427789   .0088863     4.81   0.000     .0253622    .0601957
      w_unem     .0003624   .0007914     0.46   0.647    -.0011888    .0019136
     cm_unem     .0221265   .0058428     3.79   0.000     .0106748    .0335782
     w_GDPgr     .0009845   .0003661     2.69   0.007     .0002669    .0017022
    cm_GDPgr     .2177735   .0579709     3.76   0.000     .1041525    .3313944
   cm_logGDP     .9806193   .2807897     3.49   0.000     .4302816    1.530957
       w_tax     -.007846   .0023753    -3.30   0.001    -.0125015   -.0031906
      cm_tax    -.0090701   .0029303    -3.10   0.002    -.0148134   -.0033269
         occ     .0034643   .0006856     5.05   0.000     .0021205    .0048081
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  1015.3993          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =    739.19
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      23.5
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       447
LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(37) =   608.57   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0026605   .0032302      .0002463    .0287355
       United States:    rho       .96278   .0456453      .6399159      .99673
                              
                      var(e)     .0007257   .0002604      .0003592    .0014662
      United Kingdom:    rho      .501721   .1715686      .1018584    .7620113
                              
                      var(e)      .000542   .0004603      .0001026     .002864
         Switzerland:    rho     .8654091   .1157733      .3890753     .976604
                              
                      var(e)      .001433   .0014924      .0001861    .0110336
              Sweden:    rho       .95105   .0509798      .6620405    .9938279
                              
                      var(e)     .0067531   .0090151      .0004934    .0924309
               Spain:    rho      .986937   .0175777      .8290027    .9990758
                              
                      var(e)     .0015528   .0013594      .0002792    .0086356
            Portugal:    rho     .8222425   .1632181      .1743006     .973295
                              
                      var(e)     .0041389    .001906      .0016784    .0102062
              Norway:    rho     .7238324   .1248646      .3813014    .8916084
                              
                      var(e)     .0044066   .0029434        .00119    .0163177
         New Zealand:    rho     .8199515   .1260311      .3823713    .9571278
                              
                      var(e)     .0009637   .0009339      .0001442    .0064387
         Netherlands:    rho     .8896365   .1104289      .3647446    .9854502
                              
                      var(e)     .0012735   .0007099      .0004271    .0037974
               Korea:    rho      .317392   .3425006     -.3950282    .7914245
                              
                      var(e)     .0012584    .001025       .000255    .0062106
               Japan:    rho     .9154449   .0673568       .632177    .9828542
                              
                      var(e)     .0007031   .0009389      .0000513    .0096322
               Italy:    rho     .9443762   .0746606      .4003285    .9961851
                              
                      var(e)     .0012234   .0005877      .0004772    .0031365
             Ireland:    rho     .7117618   .1356088      .3381948    .8915514
                              
                      var(e)     .0007763   .0003712      .0003041    .0019815
             Germany:    rho     .4348072   .3401604     -.3419709    .8585865
                              
                      var(e)     .0015367   .0020621      .0001108      .02132
              France:    rho     .9777011   .0298171      .7246719    .9984086
                              
                      var(e)     .0008892   .0004183      .0003536    .0022356
             Finland:    rho     .6065729   .1805627      .1426016     .851994
                              
                      var(e)     .0005642   .0005622        .00008    .0039782
             Denmark:    rho     .9279214   .0728275      .5483633    .9904617
                              
                      var(e)     .0007267   .0006935       .000112    .0047165
              Canada:    rho     .9309481   .0654209      .6067743    .9896035
                              
                      var(e)     .0011755   .0006177      .0004197    .0032924
           Australia:    rho     .5817734   .2183481      .0182305    .8647922
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
id:                  (empty)  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     3.315389   .0158873   208.68   0.000     3.284251    3.346528
              
   c.w_labor     .0001259   .0000436     2.88   0.004     .0000403    .0002114
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax      .000131   .0000401     3.27   0.001     .0000524    .0002096
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0002244   .0002111    -1.06   0.288    -.0006381    .0001893
         L2.    -.0007696   .0002049    -3.76   0.000    -.0011712    -.000368
         L1.    -.0006007   .0002037    -2.95   0.003    -.0009999   -.0002015
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0228688   .0080487     2.84   0.004     .0070936     .038644
      cm_ext            0  (omitted)
     w_labor    -.0070351   .0015088    -4.66   0.000    -.0099922    -.004078
    cm_labor            0  (omitted)
     w_popgr     -.004825   .0028826    -1.67   0.094    -.0104749    .0008248
    cm_popgr            0  (omitted)
   cm_logpop            0  (omitted)
       w_exp     .0000851   .0006605     0.13   0.898    -.0012096    .0013797
      cm_exp            0  (omitted)
       w_imp     .0008666   .0007249     1.20   0.232    -.0005541    .0022872
      cm_imp            0  (omitted)
      w_unem     .0006094   .0007677     0.79   0.427    -.0008952     .002114
     cm_unem            0  (omitted)
     w_GDPgr     .0009253   .0003593     2.58   0.010     .0002211    .0016295
    cm_GDPgr            0  (omitted)
   cm_logGDP            0  (omitted)
       w_tax    -.0078015   .0022099    -3.53   0.000    -.0121327   -.0034702
      cm_tax            0  (omitted)
         occ     .0035426   .0006032     5.87   0.000     .0023603    .0047248
              
         19      .3220909   .0437565     7.36   0.000     .2363299     .407852
         18      .2475991   .0149597    16.55   0.000     .2182786    .2769196
         17       .066469   .0185681     3.58   0.000     .0300762    .1028617
         16     -.1508978   .0317323    -4.76   0.000    -.2130921   -.0887036
         15      .1148592    .076946     1.49   0.136    -.0359522    .2656705
         14      .1408344   .0278408     5.06   0.000     .0862673    .1954014
         13     -.1080546   .0304876    -3.54   0.000    -.1678092      -.0483
         12      .0393393   .0367731     1.07   0.285    -.0327345    .1114132
         11      .0018727    .023181     0.08   0.936    -.0435612    .0473067
         10      .2898264   .0212562    13.63   0.000     .2481651    .3314877
          9      .2086998   .0271784     7.68   0.000      .155431    .2619685
          8      .0495177   .0237161     2.09   0.037     .0030349    .0960004
          7      .1493295   .0196294     7.61   0.000     .1108566    .1878024
          6      .1625109   .0157411    10.32   0.000     .1316589    .1933629
          5      .0889356    .036752     2.42   0.016      .016903    .1609682
          4      .0134248   .0177166     0.76   0.449    -.0212991    .0481488
          3     -.1391474   .0209179    -6.65   0.000    -.1801458    -.098149
          2      .2424141   .0229746    10.55   0.000     .1973846    .2874435
          id  
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  1173.7934                     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(32)      =   1556.24
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      23.5
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects ML regression                     Number of obs      =       447
94 
 
Fixed FD model: 
                                                                               
       _cons     .0051434   .0057886     0.89   0.374     -.006202    .0164888
              
  cD.w_labor     .0001173   .0000946     1.24   0.215    -.0000682    .0003028
    c.cm_imp# 
              
    cD.w_tax     .0001292   .0000419     3.09   0.002     .0000471    .0002112
    c.cm_tax# 
              
        L3D.    -.0000713   .0001918    -0.37   0.710    -.0004473    .0003047
        L2D.     -.000352   .0002033    -1.73   0.083    -.0007506    .0000465
         LD.     -.000278    .000196    -1.42   0.156    -.0006621     .000106
       w_tax  
              
         D1.     .0150633   .0080853     1.86   0.062    -.0007835    .0309101
       w_ext  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_ext  
              
         D1.     -.005822    .003202    -1.82   0.069    -.0120978    .0004538
     w_labor  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_labor  
              
         D1.    -.0057228   .0024797    -2.31   0.021    -.0105829   -.0008626
     w_popgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_popgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
   cm_logpop  
              
         D1.     .0005697   .0006238     0.91   0.361     -.000653    .0017924
       w_exp  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_exp  
              
         D1.     .0005166   .0006705     0.77   0.441    -.0007976    .0018308
       w_imp  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_imp  
              
         D1.    -.0003588   .0007593    -0.47   0.637     -.001847    .0011294
      w_unem  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
     cm_unem  
              
         D1.     .0007549   .0003239     2.33   0.020       .00012    .0013897
     w_GDPgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_GDPgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
   cm_logGDP  
              
         D1.    -.0074365   .0023192    -3.21   0.001    -.0119821   -.0028908
       w_tax  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_tax  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
         occ  
              
         19      .0039714   .0062967     0.63   0.528    -.0083698    .0163127
         18      .0008773   .0076336     0.11   0.909    -.0140843    .0158389
         17      -.000447    .007544    -0.06   0.953    -.0152329    .0143389
         16     -.0000108   .0060585    -0.00   0.999    -.0118852    .0118636
         15     -.0076494   .0065867    -1.16   0.245    -.0205591    .0052602
         14      .0076852    .007417     1.04   0.300    -.0068519    .0222223
         13      .0048036   .0097868     0.49   0.624    -.0143782    .0239855
         12     -.0022515   .0119369    -0.19   0.850    -.0256474    .0211444
         11     -.0058911   .0061672    -0.96   0.339    -.0179785    .0061963
         10      .0069967    .013434     0.52   0.602    -.0193336    .0333269
          9      .0021708   .0079867     0.27   0.786    -.0134827    .0178244
          8      .0018662   .0063071     0.30   0.767    -.0104954    .0142279
          7     -.0005312   .0108393    -0.05   0.961    -.0217757    .0207134
          6      .0040743   .0099192     0.41   0.681     -.015367    .0235156
          5     -.0038432   .0060983    -0.63   0.529    -.0157957    .0081092
          4      .0020879   .0083133     0.25   0.802    -.0142059    .0183818
          3     -.0039293   .0060056    -0.65   0.513    -.0157001    .0078414
          2       .000585   .0059688     0.10   0.922    -.0111136    .0122835
          id  
                                                                              
     D.log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =   941.9449          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(31)      =     95.43
                                                               max =        27
                                                               avg =      21.5
                                                Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       409
LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(37) =   273.07   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0001805   .0000573      .0000969    .0003361
       United States:    rho     .0584317     .20091     -.3244629    .4248731
                              
                      var(e)     .0007942   .0002339      .0004459    .0014147
      United Kingdom:    rho    -.1039523   .2607978     -.5518707    .3905161
                              
                      var(e)     .0001671   .0000808      .0000648    .0004311
         Switzerland:    rho     .3776125   .2712493     -.2191668    .7687748
                              
                      var(e)     .0000991   .0000308       .000054    .0001821
              Sweden:    rho    -.0713203   .2150088     -.4581803    .3382564
                              
                      var(e)     .0001427   .0000475      .0000744     .000274
               Spain:    rho     .2460653   .2271092     -.2189893    .6200181
                              
                      var(e)     .0005253   .0001991        .00025    .0011041
            Portugal:    rho     -.231037   .2562022     -.6444495    .2868931
                              
                      var(e)     .0021128   .0006217      .0011868    .0037613
              Norway:    rho    -.1640562   .1990614     -.5127817    .2311387
                              
                      var(e)     .0015491    .000523      .0007993    .0030022
         New Zealand:    rho      .309009   .2195832     -.1550973    .6613774
                              
                      var(e)     .0001289   .0000462      .0000638    .0002603
         Netherlands:    rho    -.3488806    .217121     -.6903861     .119778
                              
                      var(e)     .0018308   .0010837      .0005738    .0058408
               Korea:    rho    -.3151835   .3559421     -.8008118     .420493
                              
                      var(e)     .0002498   .0001077      .0001073    .0005814
               Japan:    rho     .5671482   .1826601        .11503    .8246168
                              
                      var(e)     .0000764    .000029      .0000363    .0001608
               Italy:    rho     .4106167   .2190552      -.079887    .7410314
                              
                      var(e)     .0008446   .0002985      .0004225    .0016883
             Ireland:    rho     .3749135    .200058      -.062027     .691259
                              
                      var(e)     .0005166   .0003009       .000165    .0016177
             Germany:    rho    -.0707078   .4373777     -.7317007    .6588201
                              
                      var(e)     .0000618   .0000215      .0000312    .0001224
              France:    rho     .3081289   .2223681     -.1616468    .6640539
                              
                      var(e)      .000735    .000246      .0003815    .0014163
             Finland:    rho    -.0431722   .2370019     -.4688393    .3987683
                              
                      var(e)     .0000629   .0000209      .0000329    .0001205
             Denmark:    rho    -.0774559   .2354635     -.4944223    .3684894
                              
                      var(e)     .0000931   .0000284      .0000512    .0001692
              Canada:    rho    -.1599759   .2120789     -.5284169    .2591737
                              
                      var(e)     .0009789   .0002942      .0005431    .0017644
           Australia:    rho    -.1537347    .214277     -.5263657    .2684364
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
id:                  (empty)  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
95 
 
 LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =   269.92   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0001825   .0000583      .0000975    .0003414
       United States:    rho     .0850718     .20346     -.3062512    .4517996
                              
                      var(e)     .0007718    .000227      .0004336    .0013736
      United Kingdom:    rho    -.1386016   .2508839     -.5654808    .3468471
                              
                      var(e)     .0001515   .0000628      .0000672    .0003413
         Switzerland:    rho     .3091358   .2459124     -.2101392    .6923713
                              
                      var(e)     .0000961   .0000294      .0000527    .0001751
              Sweden:    rho    -.0819346   .2103709     -.4599317    .3212025
                              
                      var(e)     .0001558   .0000564      .0000766    .0003169
               Spain:    rho     .3131907   .2358178     -.1861843    .6839721
                              
                      var(e)     .0005612   .0002099      .0002696    .0011682
            Portugal:    rho    -.1707256   .2636322     -.6073024    .3450454
                              
                      var(e)     .0020794   .0006088      .0011714    .0036911
              Norway:    rho    -.1846315   .1934866     -.5222175    .2029784
                              
                      var(e)     .0014572   .0004504      .0007951    .0026704
         New Zealand:    rho     .2536644   .2066887      -.171912    .5994491
                              
                      var(e)     .0001278   .0000456      .0000635    .0002573
         Netherlands:    rho     -.327178   .2246354     -.6819346    .1522003
                              
                      var(e)     .0017398   .0010116      .0005566    .0054379
               Korea:    rho    -.3578072   .3217957      -.799664    .3354366
                              
                      var(e)     .0002316   .0000861      .0001117    .0004801
               Japan:    rho     .5166893    .170087      .1165067     .772536
                              
                      var(e)     .0000753   .0000267      .0000376     .000151
               Italy:    rho     .3621697   .2128438     -.1004249    .6960135
                              
                      var(e)     .0007847    .000252      .0004182    .0014724
             Ireland:    rho      .326075   .1873184     -.0722612    .6346997
                              
                      var(e)     .0004777   .0002609      .0001638    .0013933
             Germany:    rho    -.1404522   .3811026     -.7179328    .5515401
                              
                      var(e)     .0000602   .0000205      .0000309    .0001175
              France:    rho     .3010521   .2183917     -.1586722    .6534961
                              
                      var(e)     .0007064   .0002316      .0003715    .0013433
             Finland:    rho    -.0788872    .225737       -.48098    .3506244
                              
                      var(e)     .0000626   .0000207      .0000328    .0001197
             Denmark:    rho    -.0821491   .2341436     -.4962855    .3624437
                              
                      var(e)     .0000957   .0000291      .0000527    .0001738
              Canada:    rho    -.1611827   .2085801     -.5243455    .2515931
                              
                      var(e)     .0009431   .0002826      .0005242    .0016966
           Australia:    rho    -.1851657   .2057637     -.5405514    .2262952
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     5.69e-06   5.49e-06      8.61e-07    .0000377
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     .0040879   .0010877     3.76   0.000     .0019561    .0062197
              
  cD.w_labor     .0001687    .000085     1.98   0.047     2.11e-06    .0003353
    c.cm_imp# 
              
    cD.w_tax     .0001354   .0000417     3.25   0.001     .0000537    .0002171
    c.cm_tax# 
              
        L3D.    -.0000925   .0001919    -0.48   0.630    -.0004687    .0002837
        L2D.    -.0003498   .0002014    -1.74   0.082    -.0007444    .0000449
         LD.    -.0002807   .0001938    -1.45   0.148    -.0006605    .0000992
       w_tax  
              
         D1.     .0162444   .0079999     2.03   0.042     .0005649     .031924
       w_ext  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_ext  
              
         D1.    -.0078994   .0028767    -2.75   0.006    -.0135377   -.0022611
     w_labor  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_labor  
              
         D1.    -.0058038   .0025191    -2.30   0.021    -.0107411   -.0008664
     w_popgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_popgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
   cm_logpop  
              
         D1.     .0005113   .0006204     0.82   0.410    -.0007047    .0017273
       w_exp  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_exp  
              
         D1.     .0005296   .0006707     0.79   0.430    -.0007848    .0018441
       w_imp  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_imp  
              
         D1.    -.0001098    .000764    -0.14   0.886    -.0016071    .0013875
      w_unem  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
     cm_unem  
              
         D1.     .0007783   .0003234     2.41   0.016     .0001444    .0014122
     w_GDPgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
    cm_GDPgr  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
   cm_logGDP  
              
         D1.    -.0077666   .0023103    -3.36   0.001    -.0122948   -.0032385
       w_tax  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
      cm_tax  
              
         D1.            0  (omitted)
         occ  
                                                                              
     D.log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  1011.4443          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(13)      =     66.24
                                                               max =        27
                                                               avg =      21.5
                                                Obs per group: min =         7
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       409
LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =  1112.91   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0223371   .0317445      .0013783    .3620054
       United States:    rho     .9956881   .0062349      .9286644    .9997476
                              
                      var(e)     .0008922   .0003679      .0003977    .0020019
      United Kingdom:    rho     .5594867   .1767299      .1271765    .8131653
                              
                      var(e)     .1237715   .1788822      .0072847    2.102954
         Switzerland:    rho     .9994492   .0008159      .9899974    .9999698
                              
                      var(e)     .0879832     .12824      .0050551    1.531331
              Sweden:    rho     .9986458    .002015       .975228    .9999268
                              
                      var(e)     .0206853   .0357741      .0006975    .6134372
               Spain:    rho      .996042    .006935      .8834138     .999873
                              
                      var(e)     .0050465   .0083342      .0001983    .1284475
            Portugal:    rho     .9423701   .0970663      .0591816    .9980199
                              
                      var(e)     .0075435   .0032849       .003213    .0177107
              Norway:    rho     .6342345   .1547524      .2364851    .8499269
                              
                      var(e)     .0062766   .0039682      .0018179    .0216708
         New Zealand:    rho     .7718462   .1472257      .3014161    .9400735
                              
                      var(e)     .0024536   .0034919      .0001508     .039923
         Netherlands:    rho     .9376142   .0909198      .2390328    .9966298
                              
                      var(e)     .0020481   .0019215      .0003257    .0128809
               Korea:    rho     .5639026   .4024396     -.4761469    .9462924
                              
                      var(e)     .0025563   .0038067      .0001381    .0473342
               Japan:    rho     .9570402   .0635776      .4030777    .9977373
                              
                      var(e)     .0018639   .0029829      .0000809    .0429175
               Italy:    rho     .9777863   .0359351      .5658475    .9990905
                              
                      var(e)     .0017675   .0013168      .0004104    .0076122
             Ireland:    rho     .8001981    .147756      .2858298    .9566046
                              
                      var(e)     .0009783   .0005364       .000334    .0028654
             Germany:    rho     .5627398   .2908996     -.1950174     .899809
                              
                      var(e)     .0046412   .0082615      .0001417    .1519813
              France:    rho     .9929256   .0126658      .7855396    .9997902
                              
                      var(e)     .0011297   .0007724      .0002957     .004315
             Finland:    rho     .6882944   .2138179      .0483283     .927619
                              
                      var(e)     .0537826   .0768772      .0032653    .8858394
             Denmark:    rho      .998512    .002167      .9744212    .9999144
                              
                      var(e)     .0018281   .0025101       .000124    .0269621
              Canada:    rho     .9691394   .0422435      .6140923    .9979475
                              
                      var(e)     .0018352   .0010662      .0005877    .0057308
           Australia:    rho     .6375756   .2107705       .057965    .8957178
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     1.36e-21          .             .           .
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                                  
           _cons     6.611103    .857097     7.71   0.000     4.931223    8.290982
                  
       c.w_labor      .000052   .0000241     2.16   0.031     4.84e-06    .0000992
      c.cm_trade# 
                  
c.cm_tax#c.w_tax     .0001043   .0000436     2.39   0.017     .0000189    .0001897
                  
             L3.    -.0004366   .0002031    -2.15   0.032    -.0008347   -.0000385
             L2.    -.0004843   .0002245    -2.16   0.031    -.0009243   -.0000443
             L1.    -.0005893   .0002291    -2.57   0.010    -.0010383   -.0001402
           w_tax  
                  
           w_ext     .0275275   .0090051     3.06   0.002     .0098779    .0451771
          cm_ext    -.0704292   .0104098    -6.77   0.000    -.0908319   -.0500264
         w_labor    -.0066218   .0017095    -3.87   0.000    -.0099723   -.0032712
        cm_labor     .0018403   .0015899     1.16   0.247    -.0012758    .0049564
         w_popgr    -.0051424   .0030152    -1.71   0.088    -.0110521    .0007672
        cm_popgr     .1184186   .0706552     1.68   0.094     -.020063    .2569002
       cm_logpop     .0829268   .0275798     3.01   0.003     .0288714    .1369823
         w_trade     .0002711   .0002036     1.33   0.183     -.000128    .0006702
        cm_trade     .0009661   .0007953     1.21   0.224    -.0005926    .0025248
          w_unem    -.0001829   .0007562    -0.24   0.809     -.001665    .0012991
         cm_unem     .0121739   .0057011     2.14   0.033     .0010001    .0233478
         w_GDPgr     .0015087   .0003925     3.84   0.000     .0007394    .0022781
        cm_GDPgr    -.0258107    .022362    -1.15   0.248    -.0696395    .0180181
       cm_logGDP     -.482416   .1099791    -4.39   0.000    -.6979711    -.266861
           w_tax    -.0063819   .0023921    -2.67   0.008    -.0110704   -.0016934
          cm_tax     .0014753   .0018215     0.81   0.418    -.0020947    .0050453
             occ     .0036649   .0007312     5.01   0.000     .0022317    .0050981
                                                                                  
           log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                  
Log restricted-likelihood =  1001.0311          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(22)      =    690.04
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      23.8
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       453
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The model above to the left is the mixed FD model. The model above to the right is the 
mixed model using trade 
Models below are estimated without outliers and series breaks in UK and Netherlands. 
 LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =  1103.86   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0055993   .0077701      .0003689    .0849846
       United States:    rho      .983292   .0234465      .7622276    .9989486
                              
                      var(e)     .0008709   .0004259       .000334    .0022708
      United Kingdom:    rho       .57204   .2057126       .051208    .8482407
                              
                      var(e)     .0005836   .0006306      .0000702     .004851
         Switzerland:    rho     .8712456   .1417232      .1832215    .9863766
                              
                      var(e)     .0060373    .010588      .0001941    .1877812
              Sweden:    rho     .9857563   .0255261      .6043015    .9995829
                              
                      var(e)     .0081906   .0134252      .0003297    .2034754
               Spain:    rho     .9902487   .0161087      .7749069    .9996215
                              
                      var(e)     .0064646   .0092652      .0003896    .1072777
            Portugal:    rho     .9544779   .0670318      .3826812    .9975728
                              
                      var(e)     .0056204   .0032518      .0018083    .0174684
              Norway:    rho     .7948692   .1176872      .4284776    .9367712
                              
                      var(e)     .0070159   .0085257      .0006482    .0759388
         New Zealand:    rho     .8817162   .1470268      .0885055     .990607
                              
                      var(e)     .0103275   .0418729      3.65e-06    29.18737
         Netherlands:    rho     .9974022   .0099359     -.4057834    .9999986
                              
                      var(e)     .0021387   .0021326      .0003029    .0150988
               Korea:    rho      .579151   .4170046     -.5143512      .95546
                              
                      var(e)     .0269707   .0917684      .0000342    21.23865
               Japan:    rho      .995702   .0145841     -.2563374    .9999945
                              
                      var(e)     .0052341   .0106032      .0000987     .277464
               Italy:    rho       .99164   .0170983       .619323    .9998501
                              
                      var(e)     .0125848   .0879331      1.42e-08    11153.08
             Ireland:    rho     .9690931   .2133941     -.9998633           1
                              
                      var(e)      .001291   .0008715      .0003438    .0048476
             Germany:    rho     .6785466   .2566377     -.1054088    .9423501
                              
                      var(e)     .0016509   .0029298      .0000509    .0534975
              France:    rho     .9819925   .0322898      .5207251    .9994763
                              
                      var(e)     .0529997   .0796453       .002787    1.007896
             Finland:    rho     .9932055   .0104292      .8695761    .9996669
                              
                      var(e)     .0004177    .000592       .000026    .0067181
             Denmark:    rho     .9021579   .1408412      .0004745    .9947174
                              
                      var(e)      .008477   .0311332      6.34e-06    11.33491
              Canada:    rho     .9936462   .0231894     -.6129906    .9999951
                              
                      var(e)     .0019745   .0022969      .0002019    .0193048
           Australia:    rho     .7531746   .2871671     -.3098873    .9793303
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     1.78e-20          .             .           .
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     2.165601    1.50641     1.44   0.151    -.7869093    5.118111
              
   c.w_labor     .0002492   .0000647     3.85   0.000     .0001224     .000376
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax     .0001586   .0000436     3.64   0.000     .0000732     .000244
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0000299   .0002118    -0.14   0.888     -.000445    .0003851
         L2.    -.0004805   .0002126    -2.26   0.024    -.0008973   -.0000637
         L1.    -.0004551   .0002105    -2.16   0.031    -.0008676   -.0000426
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0225576   .0084833     2.66   0.008     .0059307    .0391846
      cm_ext    -.0435505   .0182733    -2.38   0.017    -.0793655   -.0077356
     w_labor    -.0108198   .0021623    -5.00   0.000    -.0150578   -.0065818
    cm_labor    -.0037788   .0018498    -2.04   0.041    -.0074043   -.0001532
     w_popgr    -.0044778    .002966    -1.51   0.131     -.010291    .0013354
    cm_popgr    -.0734083    .099129    -0.74   0.459    -.2676974    .1208809
   cm_logpop     .0348089   .0308982     1.13   0.260    -.0257504    .0953682
       w_exp      .000016   .0006966     0.02   0.982    -.0013492    .0013813
      cm_exp    -.0142123   .0056498    -2.52   0.012    -.0252857   -.0031389
       w_imp     .0008258   .0007422     1.11   0.266     -.000629    .0022805
      cm_imp     .0187167   .0062344     3.00   0.003     .0064976    .0309358
      w_unem     .0005395   .0007819     0.69   0.490     -.000993     .002072
     cm_unem     .0061046   .0071708     0.85   0.395    -.0079498    .0201591
     w_GDPgr     .0009939   .0003672     2.71   0.007     .0002743    .0017135
    cm_GDPgr     .0232097   .0378256     0.61   0.539    -.0509271    .0973465
   cm_logGDP     .1046936    .166761     0.63   0.530    -.2221519    .4315391
       w_tax    -.0091964   .0024224    -3.80   0.000    -.0139442   -.0044486
      cm_tax    -.0073085   .0022762    -3.21   0.001    -.0117697   -.0028473
         occ     .0028708   .0006465     4.44   0.000     .0016038    .0041379
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  977.82617          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(24)      =    971.60
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      22.6
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       430
LR test vs. linear regression:      chi2(38) =  1126.37   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
                      var(e)     .0331161   .0498726      .0017304    .6337862
       United States:    rho     .9971151   .0044351       .942642    .9998587
                              
                      var(e)      .000883   .0004503       .000325    .0023989
      United Kingdom:    rho      .578758   .2128666      .0332332    .8585863
                              
                      var(e)     .0005744   .0006368      .0000654    .0050457
         Switzerland:    rho     .8698714   .1462971      .1529244    .9869028
                              
                      var(e)     .0385807    .058005      .0020259    .7347304
              Sweden:    rho     .9977728   .0034045      .9562226    .9998889
                              
                      var(e)      .010794   .0193812      .0003197    .3643888
               Spain:    rho      .992537   .0134918      .7679554    .9997863
                              
                      var(e)     .0071114   .0107024      .0003723    .1358262
            Portugal:    rho     .9584503    .063959      .3678911    .9980538
                              
                      var(e)      .012833   .0144537      .0014113    .1166884
              Norway:    rho     .9095832   .1021042      .3505327    .9907193
                              
                      var(e)     .0062898   .0064918      .0008319    .0475531
         New Zealand:    rho     .8675845    .140337      .2079052    .9847845
                              
                      var(e)      .003679   .0072128      .0000789    .1716076
         Netherlands:    rho     .9923282     .01535      .6703681    .9998497
                              
                      var(e)     .0022182   .0023425        .00028     .017575
               Korea:    rho     .5959121   .4243161     -.5390455    .9623201
                              
                      var(e)     .1237978   .1890933      .0062024    2.470979
               Japan:    rho       .99906   .0014619      .9803464    .9999554
                              
                      var(e)     .0409825   .0664156      .0017106    .9818437
               Italy:    rho     .9989149    .001782      .9731808    .9999566
                              
                      var(e)     .0065617   .0119366      .0001856    .2319843
             Ireland:    rho     .9407704   .1059661     -.0619784     .998356
                              
                      var(e)     .0016585   .0028588      .0000566    .0486362
             Germany:    rho     .7632027   .4710324     -.8358728    .9967803
                              
                      var(e)      .002262   .0043066      .0000542    .0944297
              France:    rho     .9870587   .0246214      .5651647    .9996947
                              
                      var(e)     .0018894   .0027068       .000114     .031316
             Finland:    rho     .8092406   .2753051     -.4124928    .9907948
                              
                      var(e)     .0004747    .000762      .0000204    .0110348
             Denmark:    rho      .918011   .1324968     -.0750082    .9968603
                              
                      var(e)     .0260398   .0386723      .0014174    .4783837
              Canada:    rho     .9979712   .0030637      .9614575    .9998951
                              
                      var(e)     .0017838   .0017121      .0002718    .0117043
           Australia:    rho     .7261234   .2630474      -.168475    .9648002
    by CN                     
Residual: AR(1),              
                                                                              
                  var(_cons)     .0003586    .001549      7.55e-08    1.703202
id: Identity                  
                                                                              
  Random-effects Parameters      Estimate   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
                                                                              
       _cons     3.630423   1.143553     3.17   0.001       1.3891    5.871746
              
   c.w_labor     .0002337   .0000626     3.73   0.000      .000111    .0003564
    c.cm_imp# 
              
     c.w_tax     .0001529   .0000438     3.49   0.000      .000067    .0002388
    c.cm_tax# 
              
         L3.    -.0000276   .0002121    -0.13   0.896    -.0004433     .000388
         L2.    -.0004977   .0002129    -2.34   0.019     -.000915   -.0000805
         L1.    -.0004795   .0002103    -2.28   0.023    -.0008917   -.0000674
       w_tax  
              
       w_ext     .0213078    .008418     2.53   0.011     .0048087    .0378068
      cm_ext     .0309493   .0192461     1.61   0.108    -.0067725     .068671
     w_labor    -.0102237   .0020961    -4.88   0.000     -.014332   -.0061155
    cm_labor     .0037631   .0023858     1.58   0.115     -.000913    .0084391
     w_popgr    -.0042087   .0029598    -1.42   0.155    -.0100097    .0015924
    cm_popgr    -.0199184   .1002516    -0.20   0.843    -.2164078     .176571
   cm_logpop     .1054776   .0413826     2.55   0.011     .0243691    .1865861
     w_trade     .0004214   .0001873     2.25   0.024     .0000544    .0007884
    cm_trade     .0023099   .0013442     1.72   0.086    -.0003246    .0049444
      w_unem     .0003516   .0007199     0.49   0.625    -.0010594    .0017625
     cm_unem     .0084292   .0073552     1.15   0.252    -.0059867    .0228452
     w_GDPgr      .000956   .0003653     2.62   0.009     .0002401    .0016719
    cm_GDPgr    -.0078174   .0356903    -0.22   0.827    -.0777691    .0621342
   cm_logGDP    -.1483682   .1462953    -1.01   0.311    -.4351017    .1383653
       w_tax    -.0088932   .0024371    -3.65   0.000    -.0136699   -.0041166
      cm_tax    -.0169935   .0029127    -5.83   0.000    -.0227023   -.0112847
         occ     .0027874   .0006547     4.26   0.000     .0015043    .0040706
                                                                              
       log10        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log restricted-likelihood =  982.48507          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(22)      =    440.19
                                                               max =        28
                                                               avg =      22.6
                                                Obs per group: min =         8
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        19
Mixed-effects REML regression                   Number of obs      =       430
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